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Muslim countries are often thought of as culturally backward, authoritarian, 
misogynistic, and poor in economic performance. The teachings of Islam, however, 
prescribe democratic governance and free-market economics. While Muslims, as a 
whole, have tremendous economic potential, many Muslims are among the world’s 
poorest and least educated. Corrupt autocratic leaders have attempted to capitalize on the 
Muslim dream of building a grand society but owing to these manipulations and leaders’ 
insincerity, their efforts have yielded little fruitful results.   
This thesis discusses nation building by fusing Islam, pluralism, democracy, and 
modernity. It argues that Malaysia’s religious tolerance and adherence to western 
development models fostered economic growth since its independence. Clearly, 
practicing Islam, while pursuing social, economic, and political development, is a 
suitable model especially for heterogeneous societies. 
The thesis offers a model, Malaysia, as a unique example of the influence of 
Islamic universalism, multiculturalism, and Islamic modernism to improve economic 
growth. The thesis depicts the evolutionary transformation of Malay-Islam from its 
settlement to its status as a model for Muslims and the Third World countries. This thesis 
























THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 
 vii






B. THESIS .............................................................................................................3 
C. BACKGROUND ..............................................................................................4 
D. STRUCTURE OF THESIS.............................................................................6 
II.  HISTORY OF ISLAM IN MALAYSIA ....................................................................9 
A. INTRODUCTION............................................................................................9 
B. BRIEF HISTORY OF ISLAM .......................................................................9 
C. THE ARRIVAL OF ISLAM IN MALAYSIA.............................................13 
D. THE MALAY ISLAM...................................................................................15 
E. MALAY ISLAMIC BELIEFS AND PRACTICES ....................................17 
F. ISLAM, ETHNICITY, AND MALAY POLITICS.....................................18 
G. POST-INDEPENDENCE ISSUES OF MALAY-ISLAM..........................22 
H. ISLAMIC INSTITUTIONS AND LAW......................................................25 
I. ISLAMIC EDUCATION...............................................................................27 
J. CONCLUSION ..............................................................................................28 
III. ISLAM AND GOVERNANCE IN MALAYSIA.....................................................31 
A. INTRODUCTION..........................................................................................31 
B. ISLAMIC POLITICAL FRAMEWORK....................................................32 
C. ISLAMIC GUIDING PRINCIPLES............................................................34 
D. ISLAM AND DEMOCRACY.......................................................................37 
E. ISLAM AND STATE IN MALAYSIA ........................................................38 
F. CONCLUSION ..............................................................................................47 
IV. ISLAM AND ECONOMY IN MALAYSIA ............................................................49 
A. INTRODUCTION..........................................................................................49 
B. ISLAM, SOCIAL JUSTICE, AND ECONOMIC REGULATION ..........50 
C. ISLAM AND ECONOMIC GROWTH.......................................................55 
D. ISLAM AND MALAYSIA’S ECONOMIC GROWTH.............................57 
1. Malaysia’s Growth Models ...............................................................57 
2. Growth Model for the 21st Century?................................................63 
3. Malaysia’s Economic Islamization ...................................................64 
E. CONCLUSION ..............................................................................................67 
V. ISLAM AND DEVELOPMENT: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF 
MUSLIM SOCIETIES IN ASIA ..............................................................................71 
A. INTRODUCTION..........................................................................................71 
B. INCLUSION OF ISLAM IN DEVELOPMENT ........................................73 
C. EXCLUSION OF ISLAM IN DEVELOPMENT .......................................76 
1.  Islam in Indonesia ..............................................................................76 
2.  Islam in India .....................................................................................83 
 viii
D. CONCLUSION ..............................................................................................90 
VI. SUMMARY, CONCLUSION, AND POLICY GUIDANCE .................................93 
A. INTRODUCTION..........................................................................................93 
B. SUMMARY OF FINDINGS .........................................................................93 
1. Islam and the Malays.........................................................................93 
2. Islam and the State.............................................................................94 
3. Islam and Economics .........................................................................95 
4. Islam and Growth ..............................................................................96 
5. Malaysia’s Development Model........................................................98 
C. CONCLUSION ............................................................................................100 
D. POLICY GUIDANCE .................................................................................102 
BIBLIOGRAPHY................................................................................................................105 







Praise is to God, the Compassionate, the Caring. His wishes and guidance has 
deepened my understanding of Islam and has helped me to complete this thesis.  
I also acknowledge my debt of gratitude to all those who helped in the completion 
of this thesis. First and foremost, I make no claim to originality. Those familiar with the 
writings on Islam and economy will notice that many important ideas, concepts, and 
principles came from various sources with only some additional ideas ensuing from me. 
With great appreciation, all contributions were fully recognized and cited. 
I offer my heartfelt thanks to the fine professors, Robert M. McNab and Robert E. 
Looney, for relentlessly guiding and monitoring the progress of this work. I also thank 
Ron Russell and Nancy Sharrock for editing this thesis in such an expeditious and 
excellent manner. Their patience is really appreciated. 
A special word of appreciation is due to the Ministry of Defense Malaysia and the 
government of the United States of America for giving me the opportunity to attend the 
graduate studies in the Naval Postgraduate School. 
Finally, there are the invaluable contributions of my family, who often suffered 
from my commitment. My parents instilled the love of learning and discipline and shared 
their love for my family and me. To my wife, Norizan, and daughters, Nur Fatin, Nur 
Hanna and Nur Farah, this thesis project too often took me away from you, but never 




























This thesis examines Malaysia’s experience in governing pluralism, Islam and 
democracy since its independence. We pose the question: What role does Islam play in 
Malaysia’s economic development?  Islam and democracy appear to be compatible but 
history suggests that Muslims are democratic underachievers due to authoritarianism and 
multiple interpretations of the Qur’an. Does Malaysia face such underachievement? 
Malaysia is ethnically heterogeneous, neither secular nor theocratic. Muslims are only 
slightly more than half of the total population but the constitution enshrined Islam as the 
state religion and identified the Malays with Islam. The Malay’s constitution victory was 
bonded by a “social contract” in which the Chinese and the Indians were granted 
citizenship. Apparently, significant economic disparities focused greater attention on 
giving the Malays an affirmative action program of economic redistribution and ethnic 
restructuring. The strategy has made Malaysia the tenth fastest growing economy from 
1970 to 1990. This achievement was strongly influenced by the Muslim Malay 
leadership, the inclusiveness of Islam in the economic development, political stability, 
planned economic programs, and pragmatic interpretation of Islam. Malaysia proves that 
Islam is compatible with modernity. Nonetheless, democracy suffered in some degrees as 
Malaysia is most susceptible to ethnicity and politico-religious tensions for which social 
justice is paramount. The state attempted to be closer to Islam by inculcating Islamic 
values in economics and in an administration that strengthened the secular-oriented 
nation building and the Islamization process. Muslim radicals and racial bigotry were 
neutralized by imposing harsh restrictions on political and civil rights. Additionally, the 
Malay cronies emerged to accelerate the pro-Malay policy’s achievement. Practices 
manifesting this attribute do not dilute the Islamic faith but rather show that Islam 
promotes growth. Others could learn from Malaysia's unique experience, as it was rare 
among the developing economies. Malaysia’s model in some degree can fit the nation 
building of other Muslim and other Third World countries so that Muslims can distance 





























Authoritarianism and manipulative interpretations of the Holy Qur’an are among 
the obstacles facing Muslims in their attempts to achieve the goal of democratic 
governance.1 Muslim countries, however, are often thought of as culturally backward, 
authoritarian, promoters of the unequal treatment of women, and laggards in terms of 
economic performance.2 This perception is in stark contrast to the teachings of Islam, 
which prescribes democratic governance and free-market economics. The principles of 
democratic governance, such as participation, consultation, rule of law, and 
accountability are not new to Islam. While many Muslims countries lag behind the 
industrialized countries of Europe and North America, it is important to note that there 
are nearly 800 million Muslims living in societies with various degrees of democracy. 
Turkey and Malaysia, for example, can be considered leaders in the Muslim world in 
terms of democratic governance and economic development.3  
We believe that it is important to discuss these issues now that some observers 
argue that, due to the prevalence of authoritarianism in the Islamic world, the teachings of 
Islam are incompatible to democracy. These observers have expanded their arguments by 
noting that Muslim countries are democratic and economic underachievers.4 While on the 
surface Muslims, on the whole, have tremendous economic potential, to include 1.3 
billion people and significant pools of natural resources, many Muslims are among the 
                                                 
1 “Democratization is normally a good thing and democracy is the best form of government. However, the key 
shapers of democratic political thought have held that the best realizable form of government is mixed or constitutional 
government, in which freedom is constrained by the rule of law and popular sovereignty is tempered by state 
institutions that produce order and stability.” (Source: Larry Diamond, Developing Democracies: Toward 
Consolidation, (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1999), 2).   
2 See for example “Creating Opportunities for Future Generation,” The Arab Human Development Report 2002. 
Database on-line. http://www.undp.org/rbas/ahdr/CompleteEnglish.pdf. Accessed 5 May 2003. The report concludes 
that Arab countries should embark on rebuilding their societies on the basis of full respect for human rights and human 
freedom, complete empowerment of Arab women, and consolidation of knowledge acquisition and its effective 
utilization.  
3 Based on Freedom House Survey on “Independent Countries 2003,” the freedom rating for Malaysia is partly 
free (civil liberty - 5 and political rights – 5); Turkey is partly free (civil liberty- 4 and political rights – 3 and 
improving), Freedom House Survey on Independent Countries 2003.  Database on-line. 
http://216.119.117.183/research/freeworld/2002/table.pdf. Accessed 30 August 2003. 
4 M. Steven Fish, “Islam and Authoritarianism,” World Politics, 55 (October 2002).  
2 
world's poorest and least educated. With an aggregate illiteracy rate over 60 percent, 
many Muslims cannot move into higher-paying, technical jobs and have few avenues of 
gainful productivity. Nearly 40 percent of Muslims, for example, live on less than $2.00 a 
day.5 While the Muslim masses continue to suffer, corrupt autocratic dictators capture 
natural resources (oil, gold, diamonds, etc.) and loot the public treasury. Attempts by 
Muslims to build a grand society based on traditional Islamic principles of justice, 
freedom, peace and prosperity have been far from satisfactory. Iran, since the Islamic 
Revolution of 1979, has stagnated economically and is now widely viewed as corrupt and 
authoritarian.6 
Malaysia, previously known as the Federation of Malaya, gained its independence 
from Britain in 1957. The federation was expanded in 1963 to become Malaysia, with the 
inclusion of the two former British colonies of Sabah and Sarawak on Borneo Island.  
Malaya is now generally referred to as Peninsular Malaysia, while Sabah and Sarawak 
are popularly known as East Malaysia. The current population of Malaysia is 22.6 
million, which is comprised of about 58% bumiputra (indigenous locals, of whom the 
majority are Malay-Muslims), 24% Chinese, 8% Indians and 10% others.7   
Malaysia, which is neither secular nor theocratic, has enjoyed an average annual 
growth of nearly 7% since the 1960s. 8  While Muslims are slightly more than half of the 
total population, Islam is enshrined in the constitution as the sole official religion. This 
constitutional victory of Islam was a major achievement for the Malays in 1957 in 
response to the political reconciliation with the Chinese and Indians; the two other major 
ethnic groups. The Malay interpretation of Islam continues to dominate the country's 
political system. The majority of the Malays, however, are relatively poor. In response to 
the widespread poverty among the Malays and the 1969 racial riot, in 1970, the 
                                                 
5 Mufti, Siraj Islam, “Commitment with Understanding.” Database on-line. Available from Islamic City Bulletin. 
http://www.islamicity.com/articles/Articles.asp?ref=IC0305-1957. Accessed 2 May 2003.  
6 Freedom in the world score for Iran for 2000-2001: Political Rights 6; Civil Liberties 6; status Not Free. 
(Source: Freedom House. Database on-line. 
http://www.freedomhouse.org/research/freeworld/2002/countryratings/iran.htm. Accessed 3 October 2003). 
7 “Malaysia,” The World Fact Book 2002, Database on-line. 
http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/my.html. Accessed 18 June 2003.   
8 A. H. Roslan, “Income Inequality, Poverty and Development Policy in Malaysia,” School of Economics, 
University Utara Malaysia, 2001, 14.  
3 
Malaysian government resorted to an aggressive affirmative action policy. This policy of 
positive discrimination in favor of the Malays and against the Chinese and Indians was 
meant to reduce the economic income gaps between the major races. The Malaysian 
government’s goal is to combine racial equality with economic growth in order to remain 
politically stable and to promote a harmonious coexistence among the ethnic groups. The 
policy of affirmative action, however, remains a contentious policy issue and some argue 
that it may hinder Malaysia’s competitiveness in global markets.9 
It is worthwhile to analyze how Malaysia contains ethnic friction and achieves 
economic growth because Malaysia is now considered the “most likely case” for a 
modern democratic Islamic state. The case of Malaysia illustrates the potential 
compatibility of Islam with democracy. While Malaysia may not be considered truly 
democratic, it is significantly more democratic and respective of civil liberties than many 
other Muslim countries. I argue that, in part, it is the Malaysian interpretation of Islam 
that has spurred the growth of democratic institutions and economic growth in Malaysia. 
Given the important tasks of rebuilding Afghanistan and Iraq, this thesis will offer policy 
prescriptions that can encourage moderate Islam to foster democratic governance and 
economic growth. 
B. THESIS  
This thesis examines the relationship between Islam and economic growth in 
Malaysia since its independence in 1957. Malaysia's religious tolerance and adherence to 
Western economic development models have fostered economic growth since its 
independence. Practicing Islamic principles, while simultaneously pursuing economic, 
social, and political development, is a more suitable model for Islamic states in the long 
run, especially those with pluralistic societies. This thesis specifically examines the 
tensions between ethnicity, pluralism, Islam and social and economic development. My 
purpose is to establish whether there is relationship between Islam and economic growth 
and to examine the strategies that countries adopt to develop their economies.  
 
 
                                                 
9 See for example Kamaruddin bin Mohammad, “Reducing Income Disparity for Stability and Development: 
Malaysia’s Experience,” (Master’s Thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California, June 2002), 16. 
4 
C. BACKGROUND 
Malaysia has been described as “a unique Islamic experience,” and to understand 
this uniqueness, one needs to look back to the modern history of Malaysia. 10  A 
relatively small country of 329,750 square kilometers, Malaysia’s strategic location along 
Southeast Asia’s trade routes has exposed Malaysia’s people to a variety of cultural and 
religious influences. The written history of Malaysia begins in 1405 with the founding of 
Malacca by a Hindu prince from Sumatra (Indonesia). The Prince embraced Islam and 
started the Malacca Sultanate, which evolved into various other Muslim Malay Sultanates 
in the states of the Malay Archipelago after the fall of Malacca to the Portuguese in 1511 
and then to the Dutch in 1641. The British role on the Malay Archipelago began in 1786. 
British colonization brought together the nine traditional Malay states and the two British 
settlements of Malacca and Penang into the Federation of Malaya in 1948.  
One of the most significant aspects of British rule was the transformation of a 
largely homogenous Malay-Muslim society into a plural one. Steinberg describes this 
creation as “a distinct new society, created by Chinese and British entrepreneurship, 
alongside the traditional Malay one.”11 The new society was heterogeneous—the 
indigenous people were Muslims and the new immigrants were non-Muslims. The former 
mainly lived in rural areas while the latter mainly in urban areas and plantations. The two 
groups rarely mixed, leading to distinct socio-cultural institutions.   
The British adopted a policy of protecting the Malays by maintaining the 
aristocratic classes, creating a small, Westernized Malay elite, and retaining the 
traditional peasant-based Malay economy. The Chinese, through hard work and colonial 
encouragement, became a dominant part of the modern economy, mostly visible by their 
monopoly over retail trade. The colonial divide-and-rule strategy created a multi-ethnic 
society. 
The Malay-Muslims remain dominant in politics and are reflected by the 
domination of the United Malays National Organization (UMNO) in the ruling National 
                                                 
10 S. Ahmad Hussein, “Muslim Politics in Malaysia: Origins and Evolution of Competing Traditions in Malay 
Islam,” The Foundation for Global Dialogue, Occasional Paper No. 15, Oct 1998; Ibid., Kamaruddin bin Mohammad.  
11 D. J. Steinberg, eds., In Search of Southeast Asia (New York: Praeger, 1971), 191 in S. Ahmad Hussein, Ibid., 
6.  
5 
Front, a coalition of several ethnic-based political parties. The Malay-Muslims political 
dominance is also reflected in the constitution, which provides for the rights and 
privileges of the Malay constitutional monarchies in nine states (one serves as the 
national king for a five-year rotating term). It also provides for Malay as the national 
language and affirmative action programs to alleviate their socio-economic performance. 
The constitution guarantees freedom of religion and it allows for state financing of 
Islamic institutions and programs. Malaysia is a parliamentary democracy based on the 
British model. Most analysts, however, describe Malaysia as semi-democratic.12 The 
characteristics of procedural democracy are present alongside heavy restrictions on 
political expression and a government monopoly on the main media.  The same coalition 
government has been in power since independence, winning all general elections, and 
maintaining control in parliament with almost a two-thirds majority. However, the 
democratic setting in a multi-ethnic context allows for politics to be relatively open for 
participation with relatively slim chances of winning. Islam-based parties can also 
participate actively in electoral contests against the ruling elite.   
Malaysia’s adherence to the principles of Islam and tolerance in governing the 
pluralistic society may offer other interesting lessons. Since independence, Malaysia has 
been “little regarded but generally successful case in economic development.”13 Malaysia 
has enjoyed an average annual growth of 6% to 7% since 1966. Malaysia has become 
gradually less dependent on exporting raw materials, with the growth of manufacturing 
industries. Infrastructure and social services have reached quality levels. Malaysia can be 
thought of as a well-to-do, politically stable, and rather conservative country with a 
laissez-faire economy.14 Since Malaysia can be regarded as one of the most advanced 
developing countries in Southeast Asia, Malaysia’s experience can serve as a model for 
                                                 
12 See for example Harold Crouch, Government and Society in Malaysia (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1996); 
W. Case, “Malaysia: The Semi-democratic Paradigm,” Asian Studies Review, 17, No. 1, (1993); Larry Diamond, 
Developing Democracies: Toward Consolidation, (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1999). Diamond 
terms semi-democracy as pseudo democracy—electoral democracy which lack of key requirement: an arena of 
contestation sufficiently fair that the ruling party can be turned out of power; Giovanni Sartori terms it as hegemonic 
party systems in which the institutionalized ruling party uses extensive coercion, patronage, media control and other 
strategies to deny formally legal opposition parties a fair and authentic chance to compete for power.   
13 Donald R. Snograss, Inequality and Economic Development in Malaysia (New York: Oxford University Press, 
1980). 
14 Ibid., 166-167. 
6 
other developing countries. Despite such successes, Malaysia has also experienced 
economic problems. Population growth, for example, has led to growing unemployment 
and the disparity of income among the races has added to the underlying tensions that 
could hinder economic growth. 
D. STRUCTURE OF THESIS  
Following this introductory chapter, a history of Islam in Malaysia is presented. 
Chapter II traces the arrival and the spread of Islam in the Malay Archipelago and how 
Islam was introduced to the traditional Malay institutions. In this regard, this chapter 
focuses on the emergence of the pluralist society and Malay nationalism during western 
colonialization and the Japanese occupation in World War II. It also discusses how 
Malaysia gained its independence and how the Malay became politically dominant. I also 
illustrate how state-sponsored Islamization programs were established under the Malay-
Islam led government to safeguard the unity among ethnic groups and to achieve 
economic development.  
The central argument and the theoretical framework of the study are discussed in 
Chapters III and IV. In Chapter III, I present Islam and economics, which examines 
Islamic related economic policies in Malaysia and how they perform. Chapter IV 
examines Islam and government policies in Malaysia and how both suit the pluralistic 
societies. The picture that emerges is one of an Islamic economy, which appears similar 
to a capitalist economy, with interest-free banking as the only exception. This stands in 
sharp contrast to the prevailing view of the Muslim scholars who state that Islam claims 
to have its own economic system and is not compatible with democracy.  
Chapter V compares Malaysia’s case with two selected countries in South and 
Southeastern Asia that reflect some degree of linkages between Islam, democracy, and 
economic performance. Indonesia is an interesting case to study because of its similarities 
with Malaysia in terms of multi-ethnic societies and cultures, but overwhelmingly 
different in the number of Muslims in the population and in its economic performance. It 
is relevant to compare Malaysia with India, a Hindu-dominant state and a well-
established democratic state, and has a Muslim minority that is larger than Malaysia.  
7 
The concluding chapter analyzes the theoretical and empirical basis of the study, 
discusses the findings, and suggests government actions so that other Muslim nations can 
learn from the Malaysian experience and adopt democratic principles and escape the 
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II.  HISTORY OF ISLAM IN MALAYSIA 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Islam is now the fastest growing religion and has become the second largest after 
Christianity. Over 1.25 billion people embrace this religion, inhabit 55 countries and are 
the majority in 40 countries. Islam has spread in the middle region of the world from the 
Atlantic shore of Africa to the South Pacific, from Siberia to the remote islands of South 
Asia, which includes Malaysia, Indonesia, the Philippines, India, and Pakistan.15 Islam 
spread from various parts of India and Arabia to the Malay Peninsular and the Indonesian 
Archipelago in the late 13th, 14th and 15th Centuries through merchants and Sufis.16 In 
South East Asia, the existing regimes were consolidated by peaceful conversion to Islam. 
While Muslims remained a minority in India and the Philippines, in Malaysia and 
Indonesia, they became the majority.  Islam survives despite vast differences in ethnic 
backgrounds, languages, culture, and historical experiences. 
This chapter briefly reviews the history of Islam in South East Asia and the role 
of Islam in Malaysia. Islam in Malaysia has developed in an environment significantly 
different from that of the Middle East. Unlike many of the countries in the Middle East, 
Malaysia is a multi-ethnic and multi-religious country. Islam is culturally and politically 
dominant in Malaysia even though Muslims are only slightly more than half of the total 
population. Clearly, certain historical conditions and institutional systems gave rise to 
Islam in Malaysia. I first discuss the evolutionary formation of Islamic society in 
Malaysia. Then this development with other Muslim countries is compared to understand 
its variations. I assume that even though Islam originated in Arab societies and spread 
through conquest, the Islamic experiences in Asia, with the exception of India, was more 
peaceful in nature.  
B. BRIEF HISTORY OF ISLAM 
In order to understand the foundation of Islam in Malaysia, one needs to have an 
insight of the historical, social, political, and economic context from which this religion 
                                                 
15 Ira M. Lapidus, The History of Islamic Societies, 2nd Edition (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 
xviii. 
16 Ibid., 382. 
10 
emerged. Islam in Arabic means “submission to God’s will.”17 Those who submit to 
God’s will and regard Prophet Muhammad as His Messenger are called Muslims. Islam 
traces its origin to Arabia of the 7th Century. In 610, God, through the Archangel Gabriel, 
revealed the scripture named Qur’an to Muhammad in Mecca, which marked his 
prophethood. For three years after the first revelation, Muhammad remained a private 
person and related his experience to his family and close associates. Muhammad then 
began to preach publicly, injecting religious ideas into the actualities of social and 
political life. Preaching Islam as a new monotheistic religion, he challenged all the 
existing institutions of the Arabs who were largely pagan—the worship of gods and 
economic life attached to their shrines; the values of tribal tradition; the authority of the 
chiefs, and the solidarity of the clans.  Muhammad, the last prophet that was known as 
the “Seal of the Prophets,” was the long succession of the Old and New Testament, and 
the Arabian prophets. Besides pagans, Muhammad included Christians and Jews in his 
mission.18  
In Mecca, Muhammad’s early preaching to his Quraish clans resulted in public 
ostracism. This no longer permitted Muhammad to make many converts, which forced 
him to assume a more powerful position. In 619, Muhammad resolved to seek outside 
support to protect his followers; to overcome the Meccan resistance; and to establish a 
political base. In 622, Muhammad and his followers made a journey to Medina, a 
historical event known as hijra, or migration.19 From this event onwards, it becomes 
clear that his preaching had established a new religion alongside Judaism and 
Christianity. In Medina, Islam has crystallized both as a faith and socio-political system. 
Followers of his faith form an umma, a community of Muslims, whose common bond in 
religion symbolically reflects the central Islamic concept of Divine Unity. Revolving 
around Muhammad with the Qur’an, the religion of Islam became an ideology, uniting 
the umma. The united umma asserted their hegemony first in Central Arabia and Egypt, 
and then across North Africa and Persia.20   
                                                 
17 Sachiko Murata and William C. Chittick, The Vision of Islam (Minnesota: Paragon House, 1994), 3. 
18 Ibid., 21. 
19 Ibid., 23. 
20 Andrew Rippin, Muslims: Their Religious Beliefs and Practices, 2nd Edition (New York: Rutledge, 2001), 4-7. 
11 
Muhammad’s death in 632 plunged the umma into two successive politico-
religious crises—the issue of succession and religious fragmentation.21 Muhammad did 
not specifically mention his successor. The situation put pressure on the Caliphate that 
went through several phases that coincide with the four rashidun, or Rightly Guided 
Caliphs; Abu Bakr, ‘Umar, ‘Uthman, and ‘Ali (632-661), and several Islamic dynasties. 
The political tension of leadership escalated into a series of civil wars and a permanent 
religious split between the Sunni and the Shi’a, or the “party of Ali.” The split only affect 
the legal and theological schools, as the Shi’a has produced an alternative vision of Islam. 
Nonetheless, Islam remains unified as a religion.22   
The Sunni-Shi’a split traces back to the days of Ali, the fourth of the Rightly 
Guided Caliphs. For the Shi’a, Muhammad has a special relationship with Ali as Ali was 
his cousin, son-in-law, and one of the first to embrace Islam. Ali therefore has legitimacy 
to rule the umma.23 Immediately after Muhammad’s death, Abu Bakr was chosen on 
consensus as the first Caliph. Acknowledging that the religious authority and unity of the 
umma was paramount, Ali accepted Abu Bakr’s appointment although Ali’s followers 
rejected the appointment.  
When Uthman become Caliph, he revoked Umar’s policies that disfavored 
Uthman’s Umayya clan. The decision resulted in a civil war and in his assassination in 
656. Ali was elected Caliph and was supported by Uthman’s assassins. Ali, however, 
faced serious factional opposition of which Mu’awiya, Uthman’s cousin, was the 
strongest. Mu’awiya wanted the killer to be punished. Ali was forced to negotiate and 
agreed that Uthman’s assassins were unjustified and a Shura24 needed to be formed to 
elect a new Caliph. Ali’s followers saw his negotiation as a defeat and they assassinated 
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him.25 Mu’awiya declared himself as Caliph and was accepted by the dominant interests, 
marking the beginning of the Ummayad dynasty. The civil war permanently split the 
umma on who had the legitimacy to be the Caliph. Muslims who accepted Mu’awiya’s 
succession and the historical sequence of the Caliphs after him were the Sunnis. Those 
who held Ali was the only rightful Caliph and that his descendants should succeed him 
were the Shi’as.  
The differences between Sunni and Shi’a do not concern the fundamental belief in 
Islam, but rather in practice, interpretation, and political theory. The Sunnis were broken 
into four madhhabs (schools). The madhhabs follow the name of their founders: Abu 
Hanifa, Malik Ibn Anas, Ibn Hanbal, and Al-Shafie. Most Shi’as follow a fifth madhhab, 
named after the Sixth Imam, Ja’afar al-Sadiq, who was also one of Ibn Hanbal’s teachers. 
26 According to the jurisprudence theory in Sunni Islam, there are four sources from 
which law can be derived:  the Qur’an, the sunna (collection of Muhammad’s sayings 
and practices, also known as Hadith), ijma’ (consensus of the community and/or the 
scholars), and qias (analogy). For the Shi’a, apart from the Qur’an, they have a distinct 
body of hadith, either generated from the leaders of its early community or variants from 
that of the Sunni. The Shi’a holds to the authority based on the individual, known as 
Imam. Designated by Muhammad, Ali was claimed as the first Shi’ite Imam. The Imam 
was designated a spiritual position, making the later Imams unable to seize power. He is 
to guide his followers by explaining and clarifying the divine law and spiritual path of 
Islam. There is a procedure for designating the Imam, not through the process of battle.27 
The Shi’a stress the religious functions of the Caliphs and their political involvement 
while the Sunnis are inclined to limit their religious role and to be more politically 
tolerant. As the split grew, each group developed its separate vision of Islam, forming 
distinct religious bodies within the Muslim community. The Shi’a and the Sunni believe 
in the same Qur’an, but differ in interpretation. These religious identities not only split 
the Shi’a from the Sunni, but within Shi’a itself, variant groups emerged.28 The Sunnis 
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comprise approximately 90% of the total adherents to Islam. The Shi’a is mainly 
concentrated in Iran, Iraq, Yemen, and part of Syria, Turkey, and central Asia. In between 
these sects many Muslims follow Sufism, which is a mystical strain of Islam that reflects 
the need to realize in their personal experience the living presence of God.29  
Despite the split, the expansion of Islam continued through Arab and Turkish 
conquests beyond the non-Arabs and Middle East region to Europe, Central Asia, 
Balkans, South and South East Asia. With the collapse of the larger Muslim empires of 
the Umayyad, the Abbasid, the Indian Mughal, and the Turkish Ottoman, there were 
already worldwide diffusions of Islam by the formation of new states, communal, and 
religious institutions.30 There are weaknesses in the Caliphate versions of Islamic 
diffusion. Since the Caliphs only inherited religious authority and political leaderships, 
they did not follow Muhammad’s prophethood. Apart from the Caliphs, the Qur’an is 
available to every believer. The Caliphs did not have the authority from which Muslim 
religious conceptions and practices were derived. Furthermore, the politicization of the 
Caliph regimes created severe tensions between its religious and political needs.31 For 
example, the Umayyad dynasty provoked the Shi’a and the Yemeni Arabs opposition in 
the name of religious principles, while the Abbasids’ attempted to strengthen the state 
and to give the ruler a ceremonial duty that bordered on divinity provoked rebellion and 
distrust. In this situation, a new and autonomous religious elite emerged—the qurra’ 
(readers of Qur’an), the ulama’ (religious scholars), and the Sufis (the ascetics)—to 
become the custodian of the Qur’an and the teachings of Muhammad. 
C. THE ARRIVAL OF ISLAM IN MALAYSIA 
The coming of Islam to the Malay Archipelago was slightly different from other 
parts of the world. Islam’s entry into the Malay world was passive and gentle. The origin 
and evolution of Islam in Malaysia bring us back to the 9th century when the presence of 
Muslim communities was scattered throughout the Malay-Indonesian archipelago.32 In 
this region, Islam was not established by (1) conquest through the imposition of a single 
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centralized state; (2) the settlement of a substantial Muslims population; or (3) massive 
social change. Islam was rather established through diffusion of Muslim merchants and 
missionaries who founded small communities, and sometime induced local elites 
interested in state formation, trade, and political legitimization to accept their religion.33 
At the end of 13th century, merchants and Sufis formally introduced Islam into 
Indonesia from India, Arabia, and perhaps China. It appealed to the rulers of small 
coastal and riverside principalities who had trading contacts with the Muslims and intense 
rivalries with Indonesian and Chinese traders. Acceptance of Islam by local merchant 
princes won them social and administrative support to enter the trading networks. As a 
result, Indonesian state and elite culture was shaped, not by aristocracy coming from the 
Middle East, but by the local elite, which preserved its political continuity, and adopted 
Islam as an additional expression of its earlier legitimacy.34 Throughout Indonesia and 
Malaya, Islam was integrated into popular culture. Sufi missionaries and village teachers 
settled widely and made Islam part of folk culture and identity. In Southeast Asia, as 
opposed to India and the Balkans, where it reached only the minority, Islam became the 
religion of majority of the population in Indonesia and Malaysia. 
In Malaya, Islam first arrived through the peaceful penetration of the princely 
courts by Indian and Arab traders, with first recorded conversion in the early 14th 
century.35 Then in 1414, Muhammad Iskander Shah, a Hindu prince from Sumatra, 
Indonesia who founded Malacca [later to become one of the 13 states in Malaysia], was 
reportedly converted, leading to the spread of Islam through the peninsula. He started the 
Malacca Sultanate, which evolved into various other Muslim Malay Sultanates in 
Malaya. The power of Malacca made the acceptance of Islam politically and 
economically desirable, and the conversion of the general population followed through 
state sponsorship and individual missionary activity of the Sufi.36 The official acceptance 
of Islam by the palace helped promote its acceptance by the subject classes. The Sufis 
successfully spread Islam as they realized that the Malay people, who had long been                                                  
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oppressed by their rulers, were ready for change. The Sufis understood that the Malays 
would never abandon their way of life for another that was equally, if not more 
oppressive, than the one before.  
Through the influence of monarchs and the institution of marital alliances, and 
supported by the feudal social environment, Islam faced few obstacles in penetrating the 
Malay society.37 By the time the Portuguese captured Malacca in 1511, Islam had already 
established a strong foothold among the Malay masses. The struggle against the Dutch 
and Portuguese made Islam desirable as a bond of solidarity in resistance to the efforts of 
Christian powers to establish trading monopolies. In Malaya, Islam was thus established 
in a relatively isolated environment from the influence of the Islamic theological learning 
centers in the Middle East. Initially individuals lacking religious sophistication, a 
condition that lasted into the 20th century, fostered it. 
D. THE MALAY ISLAM  
The interactive relationship between religion and ethnicity of most Malays is one 
of the major forces in explaining the role of Islam. The Malay is identified with Islam. To 
become Malay and to become Muslim is inseparable while the Malaysian Constitution 
states, “Malay means a person who professes the Muslim religion, habitually speaks the 
Malay language, conforms to Malay custom.”38  
The Malays inhabit the Malay Peninsula and portions of the adjacent Islands of 
Southeast Asia, including the east coast of Sumatra, the coasts of Borneo, and small 
islands between these areas. The home of the Malays was traced to the northwestern part 
of Yunan, in China. The present-day Malays are described as the descendants of the tribal 
Deutero-Malays mixed with modern Indian, Thai, Arab and Chinese. There has been a 
strong external influence on the Malay culture, particularly from the Siamese, Javanese, 
Sumatran and Indian. Hinduism from India also influenced the Malays before they 
embraced Islam.39 
                                                 
37 Ibid., S. Ahmad Hussein. 
38 Ibid., Fred R. Von Der Mehden, 179. 
39 Sabri Zain, “Golden Chersonese: The First Malay Kingdoms.” Database on-line. Available from Sejarah 
Melayu: A History of the Malay Peninsula. http://www.sabrizain.demon.co.uk/malaya/malays.htm. Accessed 15 July 
2003. 
16 
There are peculiar characteristics of the Malay Islam. A Malay man is generally 
kind and his manners are polite. He is courageous and trustworthy in discharging certain 
undertakings. He is conservative to a certain degree, proud and fond of his country and 
his people. He respects his ancient customs and traditions, fears his Rajas, and has a 
proper respect for constituted authority. Hospitality is a sacred duty fulfilled by all social 
status alike. His spirit of the clan is also strong in him and willing to follow orders of his 
leaders blindly. To a certain degree, however, he is lazy and will look doubtful on all 
innovations. Pertaining to religion, the Malay is considered Islam by profession and 
would defend his faith. He is not an extremist and his tolerance compares favorably to 
that of a professing Christian and he is often studious and learns to read the Qur’an in a 
language he does not understand.40  
The Malays, including their rulers, are not absent from self-criticism. Munshi 
Abdullah, a Malay writer and critic during the British rule observe, “the Malay has not 
become intelligent, but rather more stupid. The main reason was inhumanity and 
repressive tyranny of the Malay rulers towards their subjects. They are not industrious, 
intelligence and educated. The rulers make no attempt to protect their subjects, only 
themselves, far less to educate them. The other reason was the rulers’ inability to educate 
their children in humanities or courteous behavior. Ordinary Malay folk cannot lift up 
their heads and enjoy themselves and they do not show any originality for the rulers 
forbid. They are unable to change or modernize their ideas or to produce anything new. 
They copy forever the customs of their ancestors.41  
 In modern Malaysia, such a dilemma still exists. As reflected by Prime Minister 
Mahathir, though the Malays currently are much better than Abdullah’s description, the 
label of “lazy Malay” is still relevant.42 Mahathir has even made drastic constitutional 
changes that will slowly erode the whims of the rajas. 
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In discussing Malay religious beliefs, the unity of ethnicity and religion offers 
some peculiarity.43 First, while Arab Muslims have emphasized the concept of umma as a 
universal element of Islam, the rural Malays, though proud to be part of the umma, reflect 
a narrow-minded and ethno religious nationalism. Not well acquainted with members of 
world religion, traditional Malay identity has been defined in terms of more specific 
contexts – family, village, state, Malay people (Bangsa Melayu), and perhaps the past 
rulers. Therefore, it is unlikely for the Malay to seek ready models for local solutions 
based on the context of issues elsewhere in the Muslim world. Second, the Malay-Islam 
identity has provided an obstacle to Islamic unity within Malaysia. The Arabs, 
Indonesians, Indians, and Pakistanis have been legally, to a limited degree, socially 
incorporated into the indigenous community. The Chinese Islam, which is more distinct 
in identity and culture, is not fully accepted by many Malays. Third, there is an integrated 
system that has led to the perceptions among the Malays that includes lifestyle, values, 
language, and religion. An attack on one part of this system is viewed as endangering the 
whole system. Secular education, westernization and modernization are perceived to be 
challenges to religion and ethnic foundations. Endangered by the non-Muslims ethnic, 
ethno religious unity became the political tool for Malay politicians to unite the 
community. Defecting from the Malay party was seen as weakening Islam while 
economic policies to develop the Malay were the means to strengthen it. The 
formalization of Malay as the national language and its usage in state sponsored schools 
has reinforced the Malay role. However, recently the government reintroduced English to 
teach mathematics and science subjects because school children and university graduates 
have been losing their ability to use the English language. 
E. MALAY ISLAMIC BELIEFS AND PRACTICES  
Malay Muslims are Sunnis, with strong influences from Sufi, Hindu, and 
animistic sources.44 In rural areas, Malay Islamic beliefs and practices are conservative 
and ritualistic. Urban Muslims who are educated and received better religious training are 
more likely to display the religious patterns of orthodox Islam. Rural Malays are 
influenced by individual expectations of the strong impact of fate and luck on their 
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personal success or failure, and community norms within which they are expected to act. 
These are important guidelines in defining their places in the world. Although they accept 
the “Pillars of Islam”—believe in the unity of God, prayer, fasting, pilgrimage, and 
tithing—and as part of the world Muslim community, they are also deeply influenced by 
a set of primarily non-Islamic beliefs, a folk Islam that combines Islamic elements with 
animist and Hindu influences. They also have incorporated a variety of spirit life into 
their religious beliefs that are necessary for certain ceremonies. However, there has been 
some decline in these traditional beliefs as advised by the religious leaders, who in turn 
are influenced by Islamic modernism, the process of education, modernization and 
urbanization. 
F. ISLAM, ETHNICITY, AND MALAY POLITICS 
Apart from Malay-Islam identification, the plural nature of Malaysia is another 
major force in explaining the role of Islam. Generally with little exception, ethnicity has 
historically correlated with geography, occupation, economic status, and religion. The 
Chinese and quite a large number of Indians have controlled local commercial and 
professional activities. The Malays were involved in small-scale agriculture and higher 
administrative posts, while the Indians were generally plantation workers. The Chinese 
were concentrated in urban areas, the greater number of Malays lived outside the cities 
whereas the Indians are usually found in the cities and on plantations. This relationship 
has led to the disparity of income between the Chinese and Malays. The government has 
reacted by trying to raise the economic conditions of the poorer Malays. Only a small 
number of Chinese and Indians have converted to Islam, as the majority maintains the 
traditions they brought with them from China and India.  
Historically, such environments exist because of the British and Dutch colonial 
policies.  The Malay sultans were allowed to retain responsibility over the religion and 
did not encourage the Malays to enter the modern commercial world. Increased mining 
and plantation activities demanded more manpower, so the Chinese and the Indians were 
brought to Malaysia. Gradually, the number of non-Muslims increased and reached 
almost 3.5 million at the time of independence in 1957.45 The immigrants of Taoist, 
Confucian, Buddhist, and Hindu religion also changed the society’s religion complexion. 
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The Arabs, Indians, and Pakistanis minority who are involved in commerce and religious 
activities contribute to the Muslim population. After independence, the Malay-Muslims 
comprised half of the total population. When Sabah and Sarawak joined the Malay 
Federation in 1963, the Muslim populations were further diluted. In 1960, Sabah had 
37.9% Muslims and Sarawak only 23.4%.46 Efforts were made by the state government 
to convert non-Muslims in Sabah with a number of successful conversions. Even though 
Muslims become the largest group and dominated the political life of the whole Malaysia, 
they are now slightly more than half of the total population. 
Events relating to colonization, influxes of Chinese and Indian immigrants and 
improved communications have stimulated Malay-Islamic awareness. The pluralistic 
Malaysian society, which diffuses politics, economics, and religion, has made communal 
relationships more difficult. The heterogeneous environment, which differs from that 
typically found in the Middle East, has led the society to opt for some form of 
accommodation. Moreover, the increasing number of non-Muslims has challenged Malay 
traditions and values that made the Malays more conscious of their ethno religious 
identity and divisions within the Malaysian community. The poor, rural, and non-
commercial Malays who perceived Islam as being endangered have also fostered a sense 
of defensiveness that has been the foundation for Malay-sponsored politics, public policy, 
and attitudes.47  
There has been an important account related to Malay politics. After the Japanese 
rule in Malaya, the British returned with a scheme to form the “Malayan Union,” which 
proposed placing all nine Malay states as well as Penang and Malacca under one 
government with Singapore as a separate state. The Malays strongly opposed the scheme, 
which was perceived as a British ploy to abolish the Malay Sultanates and to provide 
citizenship with equal political rights to all Malayans, irrespective of race.48 In May  
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1946, the Malays formed the political party called the United Malays National 
Organization (UMNO) whose purpose was to object to the formation of the Malayan 
Union, and consequently the Union was abandoned.  
By 1948 the British had decided to grant independence to the Federation of 
Malaya and worked to find a consensus among the various ethnic groups. The 
negotiations resulted in a compromise; the Malays retained political power, and in 
exchange, the Chinese were allowed to continue their economic functions with the 
understanding that in time, more economic and political equality would be achieved 
among the races. A social contract stipulated that the immigrants were accepted as 
citizens and had the right to participate in the political process. The immigrants agreed to 
the use of the Malay language, acknowledged special privileges for the Malays and the 
need for the Malays to have broader economic participation. The essence of the “Bargain 
of 1957” was that the Malays made substantial concessions with respect to citizenship, 
while the non-Malays recognized the special rights of the Malays without any time 
limits.49  
The Malays received certain benefits in response to the citizenship issue. Article 
153 of the new Constitution stated that “it shall be the responsibility of the (King) to 
safeguard the special position of the Malays and the legitimate interests of other 
communities…” These included employment quotas in public services, scholarships, 
business permits and licenses and (in Article 89), the reservation of certain lands for the 
exclusive right of the Malays. Malay was designated the national language but the private 
use of other languages was specifically guaranteed. Thus, the Malay privileged status as 
the Bumiputera (the sons of the soil) was protected by the Constitution.50 
The British government made a condition that independence would only be 
granted to a multi-ethnic leadership. Thus, a political alliance calling itself the Alliance 
Party, led by UMNO leader Tunku Abdul Rahman (Malaysia’s first Prime Minister) was 
created in 1955. The Alliance was comprised of the Malay’s UMNO, the Chinese’s 
Malaysian Chinese Association (MCA) party and the Indian’s Malaysian Indian Congress 
                                                 
49 Ibid., Donald R. Snograss, 46. 
50 Ibid., Kamaruddin, 23. 
21 
(MIC). The Alliance also fostered inter-ethnic relationships; UMNO, which consisted of 
poor Malays, was heavily dependent on the wealth of MCA; while the latter needed the 
former to win electoral seats because the Malays comprised 80 percent of the electorate. 
In the opposition camp, there are political parties composed of socialist-oriented Chinese 
and Indian elements, which advocated greater rights for the non-Malays, and the 
conservative Malays, which were unhappy with the government’s multiracial policies.  
In May 1969, a communal riot erupted with the political campaigning for the May 
10 general elections as the immediate background. The Pan-Malaysian Islamic Party 
(PMIP) now called PAS, a conservative Malay party, portrayed the UMNO as having 
betrayed Islam and selling out the Malays. The Chinese opposition, particularly the 
Democratic Action Party (DAP), argued that MCA as an accomplice in the destruction of 
the culture, political rights and economic position of the Chinese. The ruling alliance 
defended its arrangement by which its political elites could settle communal issues 
through friendly bargaining.51 
After the riot, the power-sharing concept of Alliance was expanded to 
accommodate a larger coalition named the National Front (led by the second Prime 
Minister Tun Abdul Razak), consisting of ten other mostly non-Malay based parties. In 
West Malaysia, UMNO, MCA, MIC and the Chinese Gerakan Party represented the three 
major ethnic groups and an Indian based political party with a few Malay supporters. 
Two East Malaysia based parties represented the interests of non-Muslim Bumiputeras 
from Sabah and Sarawak. The Malays could have ruled Malaysia alone as a Malay 
coalition government with UMNO and PAS having the majority seats in the Parliament. 
However, despite different interests, the Malay UMNO respected the social contract for 
independence and the three major races cooperated to share the ruling political power. 
Chinese and Indian political leaders were given prominent ministries to lead. On the other 
hand, Malay-Muslim prime ministers, deputy prime ministers, and home ministers have 
always led the ruling coalition. 
The government, in order to ease the communal issues, implemented drastic 
political and economic actions. A “national ideology” was defined to promote a wider 
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consensus called Rukunegara. Rukunegara calls for unity, a democratic way of life and a 
just society based on cultural liberalism and equitable sharing of wealth. Malay political 
power was consolidated, and an amendment to the constitution was introduced making it 
an offence to conduct any public discussions, including in parliament, of issues 
considered sensitive in multi-racial Malaysia.52  In the economic field, blaming the ethnic 
disunity on Malay economic backwardness, the government announced the New 
Economic Policy (NEP) from 1970 to 1990. The NEP was designed to eradicate poverty 
and to restructure society so that the identification of race with economic function is 
reduced and eventually eliminated. The NEP also called for a more balanced ethnic 
pattern in the ownership of assets in all sectors of the economy and the creation of a 
Malay commercial and industrial community. The “indigenous economic nationalism” of 
the NEP identified for stricter regulation of the largely non-Malay controlled private 
sector and for active state participation on behalf of the Malays. The plan’s most specific 
commitment was that “within 20 years, Malays and other indigenous people will manage 
and own at least 30% of the total commercial and industrial activities in all categories and 
scales of operations.”53 Malaysia’s approach is less democratic that discriminated 
massively in favor of the ethnic Malays in education and state employment, but it has 
created favorable economic conditions for Chinese owned private enterprise.54 The NEP 
had successfully addressed one of the most critical political problems faced by the 
UMNO in its competition with PAS.  UMNO could no longer be accused of neglecting 
Malay economic development.   
G. POST-INDEPENDENCE ISSUES OF MALAY-ISLAM 
The role of Islam in Malaysia can be better understood by discussing the 
interactions among the country’s political parties and issues within the Islamic 
community itself. Politico religious, education, and religious law have been central 
national issues since independence.  The issue of religion has necessitated religious bonds 
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of the coalition leadership, which must balance the rights and privileges of the secular 
nature of a pluralistic society and the Malay-Muslim constituency.55 Too much emphasis 
on the Malay-Muslim relationship would endanger the pluralistic coalition and ethnic 
stability. On the other hand, the loyalty of the Malay constituency is dependent upon the 
fear of encroachment by other races.  The government [UMNO] backbenchers, youth 
organizations and local traditional leadership have pressured their leaders to increase the 
role of Islam and to advance Islamic goals in Malaysian society. The UMNO must 
consider PAS’s pursuant of fundamentalist policy that can influence UMNO’s voters to 
defect if Malay interests were not given sufficient attention. Increased emphasis on 
religion and ethnicity has become more central to Malaysian politics than in the past.  
On politico-religious ground, contemporary events in Malaysia have worsened the 
differences within the Muslim community, which is divided into the radicals, 
traditionalists, fundamentalists, and accommodationists. The radicals consist of small 
elements that have demanded basic changes in the relationship between Islam and 
Malaysian society. Their actions were widely publicized because of their violent acts and 
the government’s need to portray the dangers of extremism.56 Some of the most well 
known examples of radical activities were the destruction of Hindu temples, attacks on 
police stations, armed heists, bloody confrontations with police forces, and the emergence 
of militant groups. The most recent groups identified are Al-Maunah, Malaysian 
Mujahideen, and members of Jema’ah Islamiah. The radicals have received little support 
and are condemned by all other major Muslim groups.  
The traditionalists are the bulk of the Malay rural community and became the 
heart of Malay-Islam. They seek a traditional pattern of life, but are strong supporters of a 
wider Islamic role in Malaysian government and society. Politically they are divided into 
UMNO and PAS, as they comprise much of the membership of these parties. The contest 
between them is over the issue of economic differences within the local Malay 
communities. It appears to focus on personality and driven with charges against 
opponents for being “un-Islamic,” “infidels” and stresses communal issues.57 PAS has 
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become significant in pursuing Islamic discourse and pledged itself to struggle for 
Islamic state and society. PAS has staked its political fortune on a distinctive Islamic 
label. UMNO’s response was through a combination of argument, authority and 
increased attention to its version of Islamic development. UMNO recently declared 
Malaysia an Islamic state but without endorsing the concept formally in the constitution. 
UMNO has an immense legitimacy as the party responsible for independence.  UMNO’s 
track record for economic and political stability continue to lend credence to its claim to 
being the “moderator” for a nation, faced with deep ethnic cleavages as well as the 
“protector” of the economically backward Malays. UMNO played up the themes of 
nation-building, inter-ethnic tolerance, development, national solidarity and 
modernization as opposed to PAS’s picture, which represents racial chauvinism, religious 
extremism and anti-progress.58 
The fundamentalists or revivalists are those who actively seek to expand the role 
of Islam in Malaysian economic, religious, and political life. They seek to make Muslims 
more conscious of their faith by using education, forums, media, and other non-violent 
means to demonstrate that Islam is more than ritual and practice. The most influential 
exponent was the leader of the Islamic Youth Organization (ABIM), Anwar Ibrahim, who 
later joined Mahathir’s cabinet. Anwar emphasized equity, pluralism, and social welfare 
and sought a greater role for Islam in the state and strengthening the religious 
consciousness without depriving the non-Muslims. Disagreeing with Anwar, other 
fundamentalists want to see non-Muslim educated in and converted in order to achieve a 
total Islamic society.59 The core of this movement comes from educated young Malays 
who have come into contact with the west and increasingly inhabit urban areas.  
The Malay politicians at the national level have publicly promoted an 
accommodationist approach. They emphasize the necessity of a multiracial and multi-
religious society, which is free from government interference. Preceding the 1969 riot, 
these leaders held almost all secularist positions in which religion was considered 
secondary in favor of pluralism. The first two Prime ministers, Tunku Abdul Rahman and 
Tun Abdul Razak, were considered comfortable with a less sectarian environment. The 
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next two Prime ministers, Hussein Onn and Dr. Mahathir, both proclaimed a multi-
religious Malaysia, but eventually put greater emphasis on Islamic values over secular 
rhetoric.60 Secularists, who believe in the absence of religion from the state, are not a 
major force within the Malay community.   
H. ISLAMIC INSTITUTIONS AND LAW  
From politico religious issues, we turn to the role of religious institutions and laws 
in regulating Malaysian Muslims. According to history, Malaysian Islamic law has been a 
local rather than a national matter. Under the British rule, the official Islamic tradition 
began to take an institutionalized form headed by the sultans and backed by the colonial 
state as well as by a distinct official ulama class and bureaucratic apparatus. The Malay 
sultans agreed to receive a British Resident as advisor in all administrative matters, 
except those touching Malay Religion and Custom. State and religion were effectively 
separated. (Islam was never totally separated from governance, as all aspects of political 
life involved a religious significance.)   
The Malay sultans were accepted as the defender of Islamic religion and culture. 
Within their jurisdiction, an Islamic court system was established. Each state had the 
Head Kadi (religious magistrate) to administer the Islamic justice. The Council of 
Religion (Majlis Agama Islam), is directly responsible to the sultan, was established, and 
under it, there is a Department of Religious Affairs (Jabatan Hal Ehwal Agama). Council 
members were appointed by the sultan and were mainly from the aristocratic class.  
Muftis, kadis, and other religious officials were also formally appointed.  A shari’a 
committee was established and served as the only legitimate source of fatwa (legal 
opinion) and whose rulings were binding over all Muslim residents in the state. It was a 
key constituent of the Majlis and an important institution of religious control.  Backed by 
shari’a courts with some powers to prosecute, the Majlis took charge of Muslim personal 
and family affairs—marriages and divorces, religious endowments and trusts, religious 
tithes, missionary work, religious education and the enforcement of a limited code of 
moral conduct. The Majlis also took charge of mosques, burial grounds and religious 
education. An ulama class of official Islam was born, appointed and salaried by the state  
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to become a huge and complex religious apparatus of dominant Islam.61 Although shari’a 
was made an important basis of law, customary laws and the orders of the sultans still 
applied in many cases. 
After independence, there were many changes in the roles of Islam. The Islamic 
courts expanded their jurisdiction and punishment while at the federal level, the Council 
of Rulers attempted to cooperate on national religious matters. In the federal system, the 
primary responsibility for religious affairs rests at the state level. As the roles of states 
and sultans as protector of Islam increased, two problems arose: conflicts between the 
sultans and the federal authorities over jurisdiction and lack of uniformity in religious 
laws.62 The Federal government engaged itself in Islamic issues such as conversion, 
religious education, international cooperation, banking and economics, the hajj, support 
for religious schools and institutions. Regarding law, there are inconsistencies in 
procedures and sanctions across states although efforts have been made to develop some 
uniformity. Historically, Malay Muslims have emphasized the importance of ritual, and 
these laws reflect such religious obedience.  
There are some controversial issues concerning the non-Muslims.63 As the 
Constitution gave advantages to the states by prohibiting the conversion of Muslims, 
other religious leaders perceived that efforts to propagate their beliefs to non-Muslims 
have been restricted and the government has been used for conversion to Islam. Religious 
programs, advertisements, or news stories has largely been closed by the media to other 
faiths. Materials that are detrimental to Muslims were closely monitored. Nonetheless, 
there are growing numbers of apostasy conversions that have not been recognized by the 
religious authority and were rarely publicized. A massive effort to propagate Islam, 
which is arguably the faith of slightly more than half of the population, has created 
uneasiness with other religions.   
Based on the Constitution, Islam is the official religion and it lies within the state 
structure. However, Islam is not reflected in the national character of the state, except at 
the symbolic and ritualistic levels. Malay leaders were generally impressed above all by 
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Western traditions of a secular state. With constitutional limitations placed on its 
jurisdiction, Islam remained largely “ceremonial,” confined to personal and family laws, 
charities, religious tithes, propagation and mosque administration. However, these too 
were subject to federal laws, which limit the scope and application of state laws.  First 
Prime Minister Tunku Abdul Rahman made the ceremonial function of Islam clear: “This 
country is not an Islamic state; we merely provide that Islam shall be the official religion 
of the state.”64 There has been repeated debate whether Malaysia should become or 
already is an Islamic state. For many years, PAS and UMNO have called for some form 
of Islamic state. Beyond the teaching of Qur’an and shari’a, there have been vague 
perceptions on the envisioned Islamic state. However, only PAS and ABIM have 
presented more specific terms of such a state, yet it was not defined specifically. 
Pressured from within and without the National Front, the government continues to 
guarantee religious freedom while partly meeting the Islamic demand. The prime minister 
argues that Malaysia is already an Islamic state and gives unstated approval to such a 
vague concept of Islamic rule. This strategy has been used to advance a well-defined 
constitution amendment for an Islamic state, but such actions are perceived to increase 
the role of Islam in Malaysia. 
I. ISLAMIC EDUCATION 
Finally, we will discuss Islamic education. The Malay education is a complex 
interaction between expanding secular training and increased government efforts to 
advance Islam in the schools.65 During British rule, Malay Muslim education was not 
given priority by the state or national governments, except for the aristocracy, and was 
left to local efforts. Seeing this as a stable Malay norm, the British did not want to 
interfere though they were prepared to eradicate illiteracy. For the Malays, they were 
unsure of the benefits of education to their children; the boys are needed in the fields 
while to the girls, it was largely unnecessary. The existing Malay schools were of low 
quality. Usually, English-medium schools were taught by non-Malays and were 
unsympathetic of Malay-Muslims values. For the religious education, at the age of six or 
seven, the Malays received initial training from local teachers to read and to memorize 
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the Qur’an. Further Islamic education came from state-sponsored elementary and 
religious schools under the jurisdiction of the Majlis that combined religious and secular 
training. There are the traditional institutions of Islamic instruction as well as more 
formal religious schools, called madrasah, which are administered by private groups, 
including those preparing students for further education in the Middle East, Indonesia and 
Pakistan.66  
With the expansion of education after independence, budgets for education given 
priority to the Malay education system and to foster Malay as the national language. A 
primarily secular education for both sexes reaches over 90% of the school age 
population.67 By law, if there are 15 or more Muslims students in a school, the 
government must employ a Muslim religious teacher and the teaching in Malay must take 
place during school hours. At the same time, Islamic education has been extended at the 
tertiary level with a variety of Islamic studies. In 1983, the government established the 
International Islamic University with an Islamic curriculum that covers all subjects and is 
open to students from all countries and religions. As Islamic religious knowledge is 
required in the lower standards and religious studies are becoming more sophisticated, 
the government has placed special quotas and subsidies on the Malays to excel in 
sciences, business, and engineering.  
J. CONCLUSION 
Arab traders diffused the religion of Islam to Southeast Asia in the 13th century. 
Eventually, the Indian and Arab traders exposed the Malays to Islam through the peaceful 
penetration of the Malay sultanates. The power of the sultanates made the acceptance of 
Islam desirable for the general populace through state sponsored and the sufis. By the 
time Malaya was colonized, Islam was firmly established. During the British rule, the 
Chinese and Indians were imported as miners and plantation workers since the Malays 
were primarily government officials and peasants. This was the beginning of Malaysia’s 
pluralistic society. Independence found the Malays, Chinese, and Indians in widely 
differing positions. The Malays were identified as Sunni-Muslims and live mostly in rural 
areas. Economically, the Chinese were stronger in terms of wealth and determination to 
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adapt to a new environment. However, in politics, the Malays seized the initiative, based 
on historical advantage of legitimacy that gives them a constitutional victory. The 
Chinese and Indians had to grab whatever chance they had for a major political say in 
post-war Malaya. By joining Malaya, the “Bargain of 1957” gave them citizenship. 
Malaysia remains a pluralist state with a multiethnic leadership headed by the 
Malay UMNO elites. Ethnicity and religion are intertwined in Malaysian society. Non-
Muslims population can practice their religion freely. However, it is a state that has 
placed Islam as the official religion, given the highest priority to uniting Muslims, all the 
prime ministers were Muslims and the Rukunegara requires sacred duty of a citizen to 
uphold the constitution that guarantees the special rights of the Malays and the sultans. 
There is an increasing sense of Malay-Islam identity; although the traditional Islamic 
beliefs and practices have been slowly weakened by better education. The UMNO elites 
have envisioned developing Islam to a state that goes beyond ritual. By giving up the 
traditional and politically stable ritual for a more socially involved faith, Islam may 
become more fragmented as UMNO and PAS competes to champion Islam. The National 
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III. ISLAM AND GOVERNANCE IN MALAYSIA 
A. INTRODUCTION 
From the crystallization of Islam as a politico-religious institution in Medina since 
the 7th century, Islam was peacefully introduced to Malaya in the 15th century. Islam 
eventually became the official religion of the Malay states, and significantly guarantees 
its existence as long as the Malay-Muslims remain politically dominant. To administer 
the state with political and economic stability, Malaysia has looked to the west though 
they were seen as its enemy. Since 1981, Malaysia has adopted a “Look East Policy,” 
viewing Japan and South Korea as industrial models.68 The crucial question is whether 
Islam should serve as the guiding principle or as a rule of life where Shari’a is 
implementated through the Constitution. Malay-Muslim leaders or intellectuals, therefore 
must understand what Islam is before the decision is made on what role Islam must play 
in their modern state. If it is a personal faith, piety, and devotion, then Islam has no role 
in the public life of a modern Muslim state. But if Islam is both a system of beliefs and 
practices and law of the Muslims umma, then it is relevant to the modern Muslim state.  
Modernist Muslims such as Rashid Rida and Ali Abd al-Raziq have adopted the  
concept  of  the Islamic and Muslim state from Ibn Khaldun who makes a distinction 
between Khalifa (the state based on the Shari’a)  and the Islamic mulk (the state with a 
mixed constitution, based on Shari’a and on the political laws of the rulers).69 These 
writings have influenced the Muslims’ discussion between those who want to build a 
modern state under the guidance of Islamic ideals and those who prefer an Islamic state. 
Pakistan is a good example because this conflict has agitated their leaders and 
intellectuals strongly.  
However, western domination of the Muslim world has forced a division of 
opinion among modern Muslims and a consequent different in their attitudes toward 
Islam.  The Islamic classical concept of religious and political unity has been threatened 
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by the notion of the separation of religion and politics. Like Pakistan, Malaysia was under 
British rule and domination, but its transition to independence was smooth and Islam 
became a struggling issue in the constitution.  The separation of state and religion is 
clearly defined in the Constitution.70 Arguably, Malaysia is definitively a Muslim state, 
but not an Islamic state,71 though Malaysian leaders claim it is already an Islamic state. 
Nonetheless, the crucial issue in defining the political future in Malaysia—and in many 
Muslim countries—lies on the relationship between the forces of Islamic resurgence and 
democratic governance. 
In this chapter, I briefly review “Islamic thought”72 that encompasses the aspects 
of religion and politics. Following the earlier discussion on Islamic law, which is 
comprises of four roots or principles—the Qur’an, sunna, qiyas (analogy), and ijma’ 
(consensus), I will note that Islamic law will finally fall into two broad relationships 
between God and humankind (ibadat) and between one human being and another 
(mu’amalat).73 I will then relate these concepts to Islam and governance in Malaysia. As 
experience and history suggests, the development of Muslim umma have indicated that 
“Muslims did not always agree with their rulers and thus there are many concepts and 
teachings that apply to many different contexts for opposition.”74 In the Malaysian case, 
though the Malays are predominantly Sunnis, there are diverse interpretations of Islam 
and political views, which brought certain foundations for Islamic perceptions of 
democracy and accommodating policies that are politically and economically viable.  
B. ISLAMIC POLITICAL FRAMEWORK 
Islam claims that it is not only a religion, but is a complete way of life. It also 
claims to be the final version of the monotheistic religion. Islamic guidelines affect 
many different aspects of human lives, as evidenced in the Qur'an and Sunna, which 
describes how Muslims should engage in politics and economics. Islam has a rule not 
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only for the slightest problems of life, but also for society and economic theory as part of 
the social organization. Islam gives detailed regulations in economics, which are 
balanced and fair. According to Oliver Roy, the Qur’an explicitly introduces the terms, 
shura (advisory council), hizb (party), Tawhid (Oneness), Mustadaf (oppressed), umma, 
and Jahiliyya (ignorance), which are interpreted in a modern political context as 
democracy, political parties, a classless society and the like.75 The principles of Islam 
were aimed at establishing a just society wherein everyone would behave responsibly and 
honestly, and would create a system based on social justice.  
Muslim scholars and thinkers, however, have perceived Islamic political system 
differently. According to Abu al-A’la Maududi, the system is based on the principles of 
Tawheed (Oness of God), Risalat (Prophet Hood), and Khilafat (Caliphate).76 The 
principle of Tawheed makes the concept of legal and political sovereignty of human 
beings meaningless as God is the sole ruler and his commandments constitute the Islamic 
law. Risalat is the medium through which the law of God is received; the Qur’an and 
authoritative interpretation and exemplification of the Qur’an by the prophet, or sunna, as 
the representative of God. The combination of these sources, the broad principles of 
Islamic life was derived, which is called Shari’a. Khilafat means representation, where 
man is the representative of God on earth. God delegated His power to him and within 
the prescribed limits; he is required to exercise His authority. Therefore, any state that is 
established based on this political theory, is a caliphate. In modern terms, he could be 
interpreted as a leader who is obligated to advance the will of God. No individual or 
dynasty or class can be Khalifa. His authority is bestowed on “any community as a 
whole” and each individual shares the role as a representation who subscribes to Tawheed 
and Risalat. Presented in a different format, Sheikh Taha states that “Islam is not too 
concern about building a state. Islam, from the beginning, was working to build an umma 
and there is a vast difference between building an umma and building a state. Building an 
umma means you have certain concepts and values. The umma is based on three main 
values: Tawheed, Tazkiy’ah (purification of the human being), and Imr’an (building a 
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civilization with values). These three values are considered as the main goals of Islam 
(maqasid al-sharia) producing a strong umma. Whereas a nation is built around a piece 
of land, and not values.”77  
C. ISLAMIC GUIDING PRINCIPLES 
Islamic has indicated some guiding principles in relation to statecraft and 
governance. The caliphates must face and adapt the aspects of ethics, moderation, welfare 
(maslahah), dominant and dissenting traditions, and building-consensus in governing the 
society. In defining ethics, Manzoor states that in Islam, ethics cannot be separated from 
law. Ethics and law are resolved in the action of Shari`a. Islamic societal ethics is the 
very basis of a balanced society, between God, nature and history, which require 
submitting oneself to the will of God, accepting the mandate of trusteeship, and striving 
to be a moderate community. The goal of justice is reached by treading the path of 
moderation. The moderation of Islamic ethics stems from its life-affirmation stated in the 
Qur’an: “To enjoy the bounties of God’s provisions but not to over-indulge.” The 
principles of Shari`ah covers the concepts of general consensus, preference for the better, 
and public welfare, which all have moderating influences on Muslim society. The Islamic 
arts, the Islamic way of life, the thought and action are all good expressions of the 
fundamental Islamic ethic of justice and moderation. The adoption of the ethic of 
moderation may save Muslim societies from the problems of consumerism and the 
wastefulness of human and natural resources in pursuit of personal interest.78  
The theory of maslahah (utility or welfare) denotes public interest or general 
human good. Muslim scholars, namely Al-Ghazali and Shatibi, have divided public 
interest into three categories: essential, complementary, and desirable.79 Essentials 
interest protects religion, life, children, and property, which government needs to 
safeguard at any cost. The complementary and desirable interest tends to vary according 
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to social and economic conditions. Government protects them only when its primary duty 
of protecting the essential interests has been fulfilled. The government should protect the 
three categories of interests because they entail human needs, but anything beyond them 
is wastefulness. Striving for these interests, even when it may cause harm to some 
individuals, is allowed if the number of beneficiaries is more than those who suffer. 
Seeking self-benefit is forbidden only when the harm to others is actual and not just 
potential. The fundamental criterion of public interest is to provide good to a larger 
number of people than it harms. This criterion is Shar’ia-oriented because the ultimate 
goal of the Shari’a is to benefit the society. 80 Maslahah is pertinent in economics, but it 
can be perceived as violating individual rights. Such examples are fixing price, 
expropriating private property, or increasing taxes of alcohol or tobacco products.  
Muslims’ behavior in social interaction can also be influenced by the dominant 
and dissenting traditions. According to Ahmad Hussein, scholars studying agrarian 
societies used to categorize tradition as great and little.81 The great tradition represents 
the distinctive patterns of belief and behavior valued by society’s elite. It also emphasizes 
political control and use of the powers and symbols of the state, and on the dominant 
actors who are determined to defend their authority. Small tradition applies mainly to the 
norms of small, homogenous peasant villages where life is governed by customs, 
subsistence production and an oral tradition. Dissenting tradition, on the other hand, is a 
tradition of organized protest, usually led by the middle and educated classes and 
dissatisfied men of religion—in most cases, a tradition of a counter-elite.  
Both traditions exist in Islam. Each portrays itself as true and others as 
deviationist.  In ideological terms, scholars call them dominant or official Islam, as 
opposed to dissenting or alternative Islam. Although both traditions share some 
consensus on what Islam is, they differ on key aspects of its translation. According to 
Ahmad Hussein, the difference between the two traditions, in the case of the late 20th 
century Islamic revivalism, fits the concept of tension between the forces of prudence and  
                                                 
80 Ibid., Muhammad Akram Khan.  
81  Ibid., Ahmad Hussein, 6. 
36 
those of legitimacy—between a philosophical understanding of politics and a strictly 
legalistic one. The former was the Islam of those in authority while the latter of those 
challenging those in power.82 
The contentious issue of correct interpretation of Islam has invited scholars and 
thinkers such as Sardar, to suggest that Islam needs to make an attempt at building a 
consensus or Ijtihad to reform Islam.83 Sardar argues that Muslims have been 
comfortably relying on age-old interpretations of Islam that makes them feel 
uncomfortable with modernity. Muslims should not blame the west for injustices, but 
should realize that Islam is far from being a liberating force for equality, justice and 
humane values. Historic interpretation of Islam had dragged Muslims back to a history, 
when Islam has little relevance to their daily lives apart from rituals and worship. Muslim 
civilization is now so fragmented and shattered that they have to rebuild it.84 According 
to Sardar, when Muslim countries impose the Shari`a, there are contradictions that were 
inherent in the formulation and evolution of fiqh, or jurisprudence. Imposing Shari’a 
based on historical interpretation will be out of context in modern time. As people follow 
it literally, Islam is reduced to a totalistic ideology, exactly like what the Islamic 
movements have reduced Islam to. When this ideology is placed within an Islamic state, 
the Shari`a will be at the center stage. This ideology can become an action program of a 
vested group, which loses its humanity like the Taliban.85 The basic discussion on 
Islamic principles and contestation issues of interpretation suggest that Islam is not only a 
religion, but also an integrative worldview. Islamic principles are beautifully laid down, 
but due to existing division in interpreting Islam, Muslim societies had not received 
optimum benefits from these guiding principles unless proper consensus building on 
jurisprudence was achieved. 
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D. ISLAM AND DEMOCRACY 
In the Qur’an, there are some verses that called for shura or consultations, as well 
as the responsibility of state and people in telling what is good, and forbidding what is 
wrong. These are some examples of the Qur’an that can be interpreted as political 
thoughts that are accommodative to democracy. The political philosophy, either in Islam 
or democracy, revolves around power and authority, legitimacy of the ruler and the right 
to rule over the people. Inherently, the democratic political method practiced by 
Muhammad falls back to his successors, the four Rightly Guided Caliphs, and other 
agents in the forms of legitimate rulers bonded by the Shari’a. Sayyid Qutb expands on 
that Shari’a means everything legislated by God for ordering man’s life including the 
principles of belief, administration and justice, morality and human relationships, and 
knowledge.86 
Islamic democracy lies on the principles of Khilafa while western democracy is 
based on the concept of popular sovereignty. To the west, people are sovereign, but to 
Islam, sovereignty is vested by God and the people are His caliphs or representatives. 
People make their own rules in the west whereas in Islam, the Shari’a of God given to 
His representatives must be followed.  Western democracy works to fulfill the will of the 
people while in Islam the people have to fulfill the will of God.87  
How does Islam form a government?  The authority of the ruler comes from the 
public’s will and cannot force himself over the people. He has to rule through people’s 
participation and consultation, and those who elect him as their representative. Authority 
must be used to secure justice for all, without any discrimination, and oppression is 
strongly forbidden. For human rights, it is those that are granted by God. Unlike the 
rulers that can withdraw rights granted to the people, no individual or institution has the 
authority to withdraw the rights given by God. All Muslims and administrators have to 
accept, recognize, and enforce them.  
There is no doubt that the Qur’an and the prophet [Hadith] had provided 
guidelines for societies, but neither the Qur’an nor Hadith is explicit on methods of 
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government. Some of the early Muslim philosophers proposed political theories, but in 
practice it was never influential. History shows that the institutions of the time, though it 
was an Islamic government, were basically monarchy like the Umayyad and the Abbasid 
caliphates, and most Arab countries now.88 Since the legitimacy of the kings and caliphs 
has appealed to Islam, they have to observe the Shari’a. Their legitimacy was retained as 
long as they did not reject Shari’a publicly. This means that all states are not ruled by 
sincere leaders, since the extend to which government heeded Islamic teachings has 
steadily decreased. The religion instead is used as the latest tool to those who quest 
power. Modern Muslim scholars have attempted to make Islam fit western democracy 
and are interested in establishing social harmony on the basis of Shar’ia and with other 
dimensions of the religion.  
Islam also provides some insight for governing pluralist societies. In Medina, 
Muhammad worked to create a community based on shared religious beliefs, ceremonies, 
ethics, and laws that would unite groups into a new Arabian society.89 The “Constitution 
of Medina” that outlined procedures for reconciliation between Muslims community in 
Mecca and Medina with non-Muslims was accepted by modern Muslims as guidance for 
pluralistic society based on Islamic traditions and revelation.90 As Muslim umma of the 
Southeast Asia were not yet part of a unified culture or empire, Muslim leaders should 
observe this constitution as many Muslims including Islamic activists have called for a 
pluralist democracy. According to Ramage, in Malaysia and Indonesia, for example, non-
governmental organizations (NGOs), mass-based organizations, women’s rights 
advocacy groups, and even leading government figures now work to promote democratic 
values, human rights, a free and critical press, religious tolerance, and gender equality 
from an Islamic perspective.91  
E. ISLAM AND STATE IN MALAYSIA 
Through my earlier discussions, the Malaysian scenario is different from the 
normal development in other Islamic countries for certain reasons. I have pointed out that 
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Malays are defined as being of the Muslim faith. Constitutionally (or legally), a Malay is 
identified with Islam. In addition, though the Malays have adhered to Islam since the 15th 
century, yet they are conservative, feudal and traditional. During the pre-independence 
days, each of the Malay States had its own Sultan, and Islam was accepted as part of 
statehood. In every state, the Sultan had the full prerogative to make decisions on all 
matters relating to the state. 
During the course of independence and post-independence, Malay politics became 
more democratic as Myron Weiner states that the most empirically persuasive 
explanation for democracy in the developing world is the British colonial heritage.92 
They left behind the Westminster model of parliamentary system, a strong constitutional 
basis for democracy. Many ex-British colonies, such as Pakistan and Malaysia, are now 
Muslim countries with various degrees of democracy.  
Before independence, Islam was not a factor in the political process, but it 
changed in a few years prior to independence once politics became open. Two prominent 
Malay political parties, the United Malay National Organization (UMNO) and the Pan-
Islamic Party of Malaysia (PAS), were organized and each responded to their Malay and 
Muslims constituencies. During the 1955 federal election, an interesting event about 
Islam and politics happened. In order to win votes, PAS exploited the conservative rural 
Malays by appealing for support merely through Islam, through the rationale that “we are 
Muslims and that we have to vote a fellow Muslim into power.”93 Being conservative, 
the Malays usually consider the benefits of the afterworld as opposed to the world. They 
were not really interested in development, making it easier for PAS to operate within that 
environment. After independence, Malaysia succeeded in improving material 
development. The UMNO, which led the Alliance, proceeded to use the wealth of the 
country to develop the rural areas, which were given top priority. The government 
developed roads, schools, and health centers, creating the necessary infrastructure for 
rural development, and in terms of providing education and opportunities for the rural 
Malays to progress. However, these opportunities were very limited before 1969. PAS, 
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with other opposition political parties, as well as the electorate found it difficult as they 
knew of the government’s success. Under such circumstances, PAS appealed solely to 
religious and racial sentiment through a “we are Muslims” slogan.94  
Further development in the political process in Malaysia saw the opposition 
political parties, particularly PAS, exploiting the religious and racial sentiments of the 
Malays. They argued that as an Islamic Party, Malays should turn to PAS in order to 
improve material circumstances. That political process ended with an event in Malaysian 
politics, known as the “Incident of 13 May 1969,” which led the government to 
implement the New Economic Policy (NEP) in favor of the Malay. According to John 
Mbaku et al., strong ethnic identification frequently results in the exclusion and 
marginalization of some groups from the mainstream of national politics and the 
economy. Groups compete to control the political machinery, and once in power adopt 
policies that favor some groups at the expenses of others.95 Mbaku has pointed out 
further that a primary cause of the low level of social and economic development in many 
third-world countries is the failure to deal effectively with diversity. I believe that 
peaceful coexistence of the main ethnic groups in Malaysia where racial conflict such as 
May 1969 has not repeated due to the negotiation and social contract prior to 
independence. This condition is necessary for effective governance and for social and 
economic advancement that Malaysia has experienced.  
The success of that developmental process in Malaysia meant that the politics of 
development became increasingly lower in the priorities of all political parties that had 
brought problems to the government.96 This conservative and religious Malay group, 
which was the backbone of the political process in Malaysia, had changed into a 
modernized group that had been exposed to education. Within this environment of 
development, new demands arose. The demands turned out to be much more 
ideologically orientated, as opposed to being purely development. PAS began to realize 
that there were issues of common interest and so they started advocating Islam as the 
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most suitable religion for Malays. The Malays moving from the kampung (village) to the 
urban areas within a short period of time suffers cultural shocks since most village folk 
were unable to cope with the pace of development. In terms of religion many turned to 
deviationist teachings, or expressed themselves politically by joining PAS or giving 
support to the Islamic Party. 
The political Muslims, termed as fundamentalists or revivalists in the previous 
chapter, have contributed to the interesting political scene that Malaysia currently 
experiencing. UMNO, being too long in power since 1959, refuses to accept reality or to 
adapt to the changes that have taken place. The Islamic Party, which is treated with 
suspicion in the Malaysian context, managed to draw away UMNO-orientated supporters, 
not because they are a real alternative, but because UMNO has under-performed and has 
not given space to a new generation of members.  
The government is losing its credibility, as it preaches what it does not practice. 
For example, in religious education, whatever proposals the present government 
formulates are no longer acceptable. This question of credibility results from the fact that 
the government has been in power for over 20 years and has lost its perspective of the 
peoples’ needs and wants. In Malaysia today, loyalty to the leader and one’s political 
cronies is not only expected, it is even thoroughly acceptable. From the ethical 
perspective, Islam does not condone corruption, cronyism and nepotism, but these are 
popular words now as they do exist. 
These ethical issues exist as a part of fulfilling the concept of maslahah. 
According to Esposito, since the 1970’s, Islam has proven to be a major force in Muslim 
societies where development theory predicted the progressive Westernization and 
secularization of society.97 After decades of independence, most Muslim countries 
adopted Western development models and develop a more secular Muslim states. 
According to Esposito and Voll, Islamic political theories show models of other types of 
democracy, which are based on indigenously rooted forms of political participation and 
empowerment. Most Muslim governments are relatively authoritarian and dictatorial, but 
they are also secular and western in some ways. The complementary nature of Islam and 
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western values include their sharing a commitment to democracy.98 This scenario is very 
similar to Malaysia since 1981; Malaysia started to adopt the “Look East Policy” for its 
development model. However, other Muslim countries particularly Iran, Saudi Arabia, 
Qatar, Kuwait, United Arab Emirates, or Sudan are not secular and western oriented. 
Malaysia has learned in the old traditional way from the Westminster and Western-type 
of democracy that Islam and religion should be separated from politics. “Common 
argument holds that the religious and secular authorities are joined in Islamic society. 
Political and religious authority are strictly separated in the West and fused in the Muslim 
world.” 99 In such a way, the constitution does not mention Malaysia as an Islamic state; 
rather it is a secular Muslim state.  
UMNO leaders have argued that it is no longer the case. Referring to the context 
of the political process that is ongoing in Malaysia, Musa Hitam, a prominent UMNO 
veteran, says, “Islam and religion is part and parcel of politics and which we have to live 
with.”100 According to him, “Malaysia is still a vibrant and open society despite the 
restrictions that are in place, in which religion is a very important factor. The government 
must not be reactive in facing the Islamic party or an Islamic resurgence because it could 
undermine the modernization. Having people more educated, more facilities, and more 
exposure to modernization, the more liberal tend to be in their views. Such changes will 
take a long time, but will change gradually as they become more receptive to the idea of 
modernization.”  
Prime Minister Mahathir, after publicly declaring Malaysia as an Islamic state, 
challenged the Islamic Party to put in writing their version of an Islamic state. PAS 
responses are that what constitutes an Islamic state is reflected in their party manifesto 
and their policies in the states of Kelantan and Trengganu.101 Even the Chinese are 
beginning to give favorable feedback about the PAS, claiming that the administration is 
much more business friendly, and they had less difficulty doing business in these two 
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states. That was claimed by PAS to be the positive aspect of Islam as they are practicing 
it in relation to governance. Of course, there are also other aspects of Islamic governance 
that may prove more controversial. 
Malaysia is a semi-democracy, but UMNO claims its electoral processes are 
considered democratic. According to Mahathir, the UMNO President and the Chairman 
of the National Coalition, out of 10 general elections since independence, opposition 
parties have won not only numerous parliamentary seats but were now able to form state 
governments in two Malaysian States. He argues that correctly interpreting Islam and 
applying principles of democracy in a unique way have made Malaysia more successful 
than other Muslim countries.102 However, Mahathir’s regime has been labeled as 
authoritarian. Apparently, he is more concerned about the maslahah of the society. In a 
pluralist society like Malaysia, the well being of the society as a whole is more important 
than focusing on the rights of certain individual or political party. Malaysia learned a 
bitter experience during the racial riot of 1969. 
In many Muslim countries, violence and underdevelopment remains largely 
unaddressed. Huntington finds that Islam is prone to political violence, which has 
predisposed Muslim societies to authoritarianism.103 A recent study by Monty Marshall 
suggests that of 207 major cases of intrastate violence, 72 (35%) of the total occurred in 
Muslim countries. It is obvious that the Muslim world has its fair share of violence.104   
Since the issue of violence is universal, it is essential to explore the reasons 
Muslim states are authoritarianism, or less hospitable to democracy. Studies on Islamic 
government agree that there is a distinct difference between Islam and Judaism or 
Christianity. In Islam, religion is integral to all areas of life, which encompass politics, 
law and society. A head of state is to ensure governance according to Islam, to spread, 
and to defend Islamic rule. The importance of law gives the ulama or spiritual leader a 
special status as a guardian of religion orthodox. 
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Referring to Al-Suwaidi, Muslims have continued to assume that only a religious 
leader can provide good governance for the Muslim community. Muslims seek a 
religious leader to guide the political community; thus one would expect most political 
leaders in the Muslim world to be a religious leader.105  Surprisingly, many of the 
Muslim world’s famous politicians— Indonesia’s Megawati, Pakistan’s Zulfikar Ali 
Bhutto, Malaysia’s Mahathir, or Egypt’s Gamal Abd Nasser—hardly fit the profile of 
religious leader. To Malaysia’s Mahathir, the majority Malay-Muslims in Malaysia 
adheres to the fundamental teachings of Islam rather than the interpretations made by 
Muslims with political agendas. To him, fundamentalism is not about being extreme, but 
entails following Islamic teachings and the acceptance that there will be those who reject 
Islam. Islam does not advocate hostility, except when attacked. Even then, if they pursue 
peace, Muslims must be willing to entertain their proposition. He claims that Islam is the 
reason for Malaysia's peace and harmony and for its rapid development.106  
Why Muslim states in the Middle East cannot achieve successful development as 
compared to countries in Asia, such as Malaysia and Indonesia, is an interesting issue to 
examine. According to Cantouri, the intellectual development of the modern Arab world 
has been one of accommodation to western culture, Arab nationalism, and Islamic 
revivalism.  The Islamic revival has political consequences in two ways.107 First is the 
majoritarian way in which the political center is willing to compromise and accommodate 
populist religious sentiment (e.g., Jordan, Lebanon, Syria, Turkey, Morocco, and 
Yemen). The second is the majoritarian-reformed Islam, such as in Egypt, Tunisia, and 
Algeria, where the political center had chosen repression rather than accommodation. 
Though the Islamic approach to development begins with different assumptions, it still 
embraces capitalism, such as Malaysia and Indonesia. Muslims should begin with the 
spiritual advancement as a priority to be rewarded with material advancement by 
following the concept of ethics, consensus, and maslahah.  So why did Muslim countries 
in the Middle East not develop? Based on the World Bank’s Annual Report, 1996, “in the                                                  
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1960s the Middle East and East Asia had similar per capita incomes, but East Asia has 
now 10 or more times those of the Middle East.”108 The difference is that Asian leaders 
employ the conservative values of their cultures to construct a development vision, which 
emphasizes not only moral values of cooperation and mutual responsibility, but also 
economic improvement. The Asian calls for self-sacrifice on the part of their workers, 
based on mutual responsibility, where social equity underlies the system and Asian 
corporation is mobilized corporatism. In the Middle East, their corporation is 
immobilized and they failed to construct efficient civil servant that makes it possible for 
the state to plan industrially and work cooperatively with large-scale private industries.109 
In Malaysia, for example, the “Look East Policy” has inculcated a culture of Bersih, 
Cekap, Amanah (literally this means “non-corrupt, efficient, and honest”) in the private 
and public sectors. Furthermore, the government has also inculcated the Islamic values in 
the administration.  
I would like to clarify the concept of maslahah and the issue of misinterpreting 
Islam to Malaysia. In politics and economy, experts in this field, which the government 
has interpreted as ulama, should be given the responsibility to govern various disciplines 
to ensure that public interests are pursued by correctly interpreting Islam. Based on Asia 
Market Research, Malaysia remains a strong government that prefers stability, but owing 
to worldwide terrorist activities shifted to conservative policies. Politically, Malaysia has 
been extremely stable for the past 20 years, achieving steady growth that was one of the 
fastest in the world until 1997.110   
The current political events in Malaysia remain contentious. Under Mahathir’s 
leadership, the UMNO maintained its political dominant that continued to receive 
widespread support from urban or rural populace regardless of religious and ethnic 
groups.  Almost  all  Malaysian  respected  him  until  the  Asian  financial  crisis  and the  
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dismissal of his deputy, Anwar Ibrahim, from the government on the charge of corruption 
and sodomy before the 1999 general election. The trial was controversial, as many saw it 
as politically motivated, and it had received wide media coverage.  
The UMNO’s leadership crisis, due to differences of opinion between Mahathir 
and his deputy on policies, views and commitments, took root when Anwar criticized the 
government’s economic policy. Anwar turned down the IMF’s recovery plan since 
Mahathir (who was also the Finance Minister) had planned for a currency control 
strategy. Anwar also raised the issue of cronyism that benefited few Malays, and he 
refused to support the bailout of Mirzan [Mahathir’s son] and other cronies with the 
peoples' money.111 In reality, the positive discrimination policies have not successfully 
distributed wealth, but instead have created a new exclusive class of Malay businessmen, 
who Mahathir himself calls ‘good cronies.’112 Mahathir perceived Anwar’s credibility 
and influence over the conservatives and middle class Malays as threatening to his 
position. Though public respect toward UMNO remains, the decision the Malaysian 
elites, who had to protect their interests, concerned many Malaysians.  
The event also led to the formation of the KeAdiLan (Justice) Party, a new major 
force in Malaysian politics, led by Anwar’s wife. Theoretically it is multi-racial, but in 
practice it is more of a Muslim Party. Many of Anwar’s supporters from UMNO initially 
joined the party to submit issues such as Reformasi (reforms), justice for Anwar, and anti-
Mahathir. The party including Anwar’s wife won several federal and states seats in the 
1999 election. Currently, many of its members have returned to the UMNO, which made 
the party switch to a broader agenda. As for PAS, the sacking of Anwar had rejuvenated 
the party to make major electoral gains in northern states, and Trengganu while the 
conservative Malays saw their representation in UMNO and the Coalition being 
decimated.113 
To stabilize the political situation and to ensure continued growth, “the 
government continues to support what has worked in the past financially, rather than base 
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their support on less tangible ideals of democracy.”114 Issues such as Islamic 
conservatism and government transparency can cause changes in international businesses 
working with Malaysia. These issues have been overstated by the international media due 
to the misunderstandings of the composition of the Malaysian society and the government 
on issues of tolerant and progressive Islam as practiced by UMNO and the more religious 
radical policies of PAS. UMNO will be forced to adopt some of the moderate policies of 
PAS in order to gain Muslim supporters. The Chinese coalition partner continues to 
pressure UMNO to relinquish some control to them. While successful in reducing racial 
tension for many years, the government is aware that the Malay affirmative action “seems 
to reduce incentive for all racial sectors.” To soften the populace, the government reacted 
by announcing that “globalization will force us to review our policies,” highlighting the 
success of past policies and that that these privileges cannot last forever, and raising the 
issue of a non-Muslim becoming the Prime Minister.115 
F. CONCLUSION 
As a Muslim country where Islam is vested as the official religion, Malaysia 
adopted a secular form of government with some emphasize on the Shari’a. The 
implementation of the Shari’a by the state is limited only to administering the Islamic 
family and social laws such as zakat collection and redistribution, marriage and divorce, 
sanction and punishment, or inheritance as well as the being used as the guiding 
principles in the management and ethics of the government. The nature of religious belief 
and society is also reflected in the political development. In Malaysia, Islam has become 
intertwined with politics due to communal issues of inter- and intra-ethnic relationship. A 
strong state is assumed, to maintain order and to permit religious and cultural practices. 
The model is definitely made in the form of “top down,” which seems authoritarian, but 
in reality is more complex. Malaysia has succeeded in maintaining the value of a 
consensus among the society to remain peaceful. 
All civilized societies, including Islam, have some built-in system of 
indoctrination to ensure that people behave in a socially acceptable manner. Islamic 
government must not be passive to the ethical conditions of the people since its success 
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depends on their ethical behavior. An ethically motivated civil service must be created. 
They should be reasonably paid to lead honorable lives and to discourage them from 
being corrupt. Malaysia has opened up and learned from the west, relating Muhammad’s 
own experience that does not restrict him from learning from Jews and dealing with non-
Muslims in business. Though the Islamic values have been inculcated among the public 
servants, the political elites were accused of practicing corruption, cronyism, etc. This 
unethical behavior has some positive effects as a response to the pressure of Malays’ 
underachievement in economics and to narrow the inequality among ethnic groups. 
Ethnicity is a key feature of most third-world countries, and Malaysia is not the 
exception. Due to different religious ideology, culture, and ethnicity, Malaysia must 
reconcile inter-ethnic relationships and also intra-ethnic divisions within the Malay 
societies. When political institutions adequately harmonize the interests of the diverse 
groups, diversity contributes positively to political stability, economic growth and 
development. Sufficient provisions and constraints are required that adequately protect all 
groups from oppression and discriminatory practices. Since dominant groups have a 
tendency to marginalize others, it is argued that Malaysia’s harsh and unethical approach 
to reconcile inter- and intra-ethnic relationship is not intentional, but it is paramount 
toward maslahah of the society for economic equality and stability.  
Appropriate institutional arrangement must guarantee the rights of the people to 
maintain their identity. However, at the same time, they can freely choose to form 
associations with others to accomplish common ends. In the case of Malaysia, the 
constitution clearly defines the privileges of the Malays and Islam, but it also allows 
other ethnic groups to practice their religion and culture freely as long as they do not 
instigate inter-ethnic or inter-religious bigotry.  
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IV. ISLAM AND ECONOMY IN MALAYSIA 
A. INTRODUCTION 
This section examines Islam, ethnicity, inequality, and economic development in 
Malaysia. These subjects are not only important for Malaysia but to many other 
countries, which would share this experience. Despite being an ethnically heterogeneous 
country, Malaysia was the tenth-fastest growing economy from 1970 to 1990. Malaysia’s 
attempt to reduce ethnic economic inequality through an affirmative action program—the 
New Economic Policy or NEP—has boosted the growth rate of 7% annually when 
sociopolitical factors are taken into account. The African National Congress (ANC), for 
example, was attracted to Malaysia’s experience in rebuilding South Africa.116  
As a Muslim state, Malaysia subscribes to a western economic system while 
adhering to some form of Islamic principles in its development programs and governing 
pluralist societies. Malaysia’s success can be witnessed from its economic performance 
and stability and intends to reach the goal of becoming a “fully developed country” by 
2020.117 Ironically, one scholar has claimed that these Islamic principles have benefited 
only a few Muslim states, such as Malaysia. Other non-Muslim economies of East Asia 
took advantage of these principles to achieve tremendous economic growth, which was 
widely known as the “East Asian economic miracles.”118 I would argue that Malaysia’s 
economic success is related to innovation in the redistribution of wealth to benefit the 
Malay-Muslims as well as the efforts to create an environment of growth that could 
benefit the non-Muslims.  
Malaysia must manage its ethnic politics well and take advantage of its economic 
growth. Hence, Malaysia’s economic policy reflects certain aspects of the so-called 
“Islamic economy,” a system that Islam prescribes for individual and social behavior in 
economics, which emphasizes social justice. It resembles all other systems that claim to 
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be serving human beings and advances social aspirations.119 Since many Muslims believe 
in the comprehensiveness of their system, it may challenge the existing secular economic 
systems. I would argue that Malaysia’s inclusion of Islam in its mixed-capitalist 
economic system has substantially affected economic growth.   
In exploring this issue, I examine the concept of an “Islamic economy.” If such a 
system actually exists, we must ask what are its fundamental principles and 
implementation. I also examine the evolution of Malaysia’s economic policies to identify 
whether Malaysia subscribes to any kind of Islamic economy and to identify what role 
Islam has played in influencing the economic growth.  
B. ISLAM, SOCIAL JUSTICE, AND ECONOMIC REGULATION 
In his book Social Justice in Islam, Syed Qutb wrote that Islam is a creative 
movement that seeks to shape human life through a special vision of life that is capable of 
being brought into being when one is positively influenced by Islam.120  He further 
explained that Islam molded a new idea of the totality of life based on his interpretation 
of the Qur’an 3:110, “You were the best nation brought forth to mankind.” Qutb argued 
that this idea had its impact on all human concepts of life and in all their interactions and 
relationship, which lies in social mutuality and social security.121 
Qutb asserted that true social justice can only be attained through Islam: “The 
absolute equality of all mankind was the message of Islam.”122 Through historical 
examples, he illustrated that the nature of Islamic social justice embodies human equality, 
freedom of conscience, and absolute justice, and is very different from Western notions 
of justice. He contended that throughout the history of Islamic civilization and up to the 
present, Muslim communities have “established a principle that the Western world has  
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sought for tens of centuries to establish almost without success, namely, that there are not 
some trades that are estimable and others that are degrading; rather there are some men 
who are estimable, and others who are not.”123  
According to Ali Taskhiri, economic social justice emerged in an Islamic society 
through certain actions based upon some general regulatory and conceptual authoritative 
texts stated in the Qur’an that: (1) Stresses the inherence character of private and public 
property in a way that these properties act on the fulfillment of man's natural demands for 
possessing the result of his effort and obtaining the benefits of his business; (2) 
Emphasizes the economic freedom in a natural form based on the rule,  which stems from 
the nature of the ownership along with the belief in the existence of some limits at which 
this freedom ends; (3) Emphasizes the inherence of mutual responsibility and 
cooperation, and further considers that all kinds of negligence are generally a rejection of 
faith and religion. Islam guarantees, for every individual, the subsistence levels of his 
natural needs and the government is obliged to provide these needs; and (4) Stresses the 
principle of social balance and rejects the class system, which prohibits wasting and 
squandering in all areas, renouncing poverty, and providing subsistence for individual.124   
Besides economics, the Islamic economic system has a strong connection with 
other systems.125 In politics, certain crucial positions are reserved for the expert or 
leaders, which are determined by the prevailing situations and the societal interests. 
These positions can be found in economic, legal, and penal systems and in the institutions 
of endowment, transactions, or inheritance that indicates the complete connection 
between these institutions and the political system. Economics is also related to ibadah 
(worshipping). The system of Islamic taxes or financial punishment, for example, is 
presented as the companionship of the prayers. Economic participations, particularly in 
the service of public economic interest, are designed to provide the proper environment 
for mutual responsibility, balance, and dual ownership that emphasize, for example, the 
labor aspect, prohibition of usury, financial misappropriation, harmful acts, and wasting 
of wealth. Additionally, economics is related to the Islamic family and social system such  
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as dowries, allowances, various methods of division of labor, and issues such as 
inheritance, and the rulings with regard to children, adjudication, discretionary 
punishments, and other varieties of financial punishments.  
Al-Sadr, another proponent of Islamic economy, also believes that Islam has a 
separate system of economy. He acknowledges capitalism and socialism as schools of 
economics and asserts that Islam has expressed its opinion about all those questions with 
which secular system had dealt. Western scholars, however, have argued that there is no 
Islamic economy because Islam did not discuss economic problems such as the law of 
diminishing returns, the law of supply and demand, the law of wages, and the general 
theory of value. They seem to be under the impression that Muslims claim the existence 
of an economic system in Islam.126 Taskhiri, on the other hand, criticized the idea of 
cross combination of ideology and system, which signifies the establishment of secular 
economic systems in Islamic environment or the implementation of Islamic institutions in 
secular social structures. He argued that when this combination fails, such as the failure 
of the socialist system in Libya and Algeria under Boumedienne, they tend to ignore the 
contradictions between the systems.127  
Such claims appear to be idealistic but in reality, the principles that Islam suggests 
for economic systems are exactly opposite to those practiced today by many Muslim 
states. Internal obstacles against economic growth in Muslim countries was much 
affected by the absent of political stability due to corrupt regimes that only exploited the 
state’s resources and the absence of any tangible plan for growth with a proper national 
budget and accountability.128 Malaysia, for example, has a corruption/nepotism problem, 
not because of Islam, but partially due to a lack of accountability and the government’s 
desire to retain Malay dominance and to maintain stable growth. Externally, the 
developing countries with significant Muslim populations have experimented with a large 
variety of economic systems. They could not achieve political and economic cooperation, 
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especially among the members of the Organization of Islamic Conferences (OIC) because 
of certain underlying obstacles. Their individual priority outweighed the loyalty to the 
Islamic umma, and a great diversity among the states and a general misconception about 
the organization’s purpose and needs exists.129 
Apart from such arguments, Muslim scholars are also divided on these issues. 
Some recognize the existence of Islamic economy, but criticize its implementation while 
some claim that there is no workable Islamic economy. Haneef argues that the Malaysian 
example in attempting to implement Islamic principles in economic development lacks a 
coherent conceptual framework. Until such a framework is developed, Malaysia's 
economic system will remain more “Islamic” in form than in actual substance.130  Khan 
believes that there is no Islamic economy and that its theorization is wishful thinking. To 
him, the Islamic economy has become synonymous with interest-free banking.131 Islamic 
economists have chosen to make interest-free as the defining characteristic of an Islamic 
economy while many of its other important elements are ignored.132 Referring to the East 
Asian economic miracle, Khan identifies three important factors of the miracle—high 
savings, consultative decision making and a more balanced distribution of wealth. He 
argues that an Islamic economy should be hypothesized based on these elements. While 
Muslim economists sadly pay little attention to these Islamic values, non-Muslims who 
constantly adhere to them continue to benefit from their virtues.133 Arguably, the banks 
in these economies lend money at interest, corruption is prevalent, such as in South 
Korea,134 and not all the societies were Muslims. Additionally, Kuran argues that there is 
no workable Islamic economic system due to western influence and global corruption. 
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Government-championed “economic Islamization” efforts in Sudan, Pakistan and Iran 
have all ended in failure due to corruption. Kuran blamed the west as the principal source 
of corruption, which feigns globalization and whose chief instruments are the military, 
cultural, and economic powers of the west.135 In this context, Iran, a “pure” Islamic 
country, is quite corrupt, partly free from western perspective, and practices a socialist 
economic system, but not Islamic. Their authoritarian leaders, I believe, are using Islam 
to cover their activities.  
In reality, the complexities of modern economic relations do not allow the 
“Islamic” elements of the planned economic transformation to go beyond the elements of 
interest-free banking. Islamic economics, reduced to these elements, can be seen from 
two contemporary conditions: the absence of an Islamic political economy and the lack of 
autonomous markets/economies.136 First, in many parts of the Muslim world, the existing 
political structures are not specifically geared toward realizing an Islamic society; many 
of the legal codes have been imported from colonial regimes; the program of 
liberalization of Muslim economies is often dictated by the IMF and World Bank or 
conditional foreign aid; and foreign norms and economic policies serving the interests of 
globalization rather than Islamization undermine the prospects of Islamic political 
economies. Secondly, since the global economy has increasingly become interdependent, 
the complex network of economic transactions has made it impossible for any society to 
carve out an autonomous economy in which “local norms” can be implemented or 
enforced. Interdependence undermines autonomy and limits the scope for Islamic 
economies.  
Despite such limitation, Akram Khan argues that Islamic governments can be 
competitive in the free market if they provide fundamental legal and social frameworks 
for a free market economy to prevent foul play and to create condition for business 
competition. Even though governments intervene in the market, such as to tax, to regulate 
business, and to impose restrictions on production or consumption, and actually  
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manipulate property rights, such actions, depend upon the overall social framework. In 
capitalism, such actions depend on political or other pressures of special interest groups, 
while the Islamic system is based upon the theory of maslahah.137  
In the pre-colonial period, Islamic government’s regulatory role could be found in 
an institution known as al-hisba, which had three functions: to enforce proper ethical 
behavior and restrain people from being unethical; to provide municipal services and 
protect the environment; and to regulate markets by checking weights and measures. 
They also enforced contracts, forced payment of debts by defaulters, and prohibited 
unlawful trade practices. During Western colonialization, al-hisba underwent 
modifications and subsequently declined. By the 19th century, the hisba function had 
transformed into a number of secular departments, discarding its religious content as 
irrelevant. With the market becoming more complex, the government had several 
regulatory agencies, replacing Islamic hisba by institutions that regulate the government 
as well.138  
C. ISLAM AND ECONOMIC GROWTH 
Recent commentaries have focused on the alleged impact of Islam on economic 
performance. According to Noland, much evidence affirms the hypothesis that religious 
belief affects a wide range of behavioral outcomes and religious activity can affect 
economic performance at the individual, group, or nation level.139 He mentioned that 
participation in religion could potentially convey two economic advantages. First, while 
the poor might look alike to potential employers, lenders, and customers, membership in 
a good sect could convey a reduction of risk associated with particular individual and 
could improve the efficiency of resource allocation.140 Second, intermediating 
institutions, such as interest-free banking, may be the mechanism through which it links 
religious affiliation and economic performance as a whole.141 
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Noland then studied the causal relationship between religion and economic 
performance using data from three-multi religious and multi-ethnic countries, namely 
India, Malaysia, and Ghana. His study confirmed the earlier finding by Barro and 
McCleary that there is no robust relationship between specific religious affiliations and 
national economic performance. Something as durable as religious affiliation could 
explain national economic performance that changes more rapidly over time. Their 
finding shows that Islam promotes growth.142 Barlow, who researched cross-national 
growth for the period of 1950 to 1972 and Collins and Bosworth who did it for 1960 to 
1973 found that Islamic countries grow more rapidly than other developing countries.143 
Other research based on the distance between Muslim population from Mecca and the 
attributes of Arabs culture also proved that Islam promotes growth.144 With regards to 
Malaysia, Nolan’s study on development at a sub-national level found that there is no 
robust relationship between specific religious affiliations and national economic 
performance, or that Islam promotes growth.  
In contrast with these findings, Muslims today are relatively poor, either at the 
individual or the national level, despite an abundance of resources. Arguably, since the 
Qur’an is open-ended and subject to interpretation, Islam preaches fatalism, which is 
detrimental to growth. However, there are also Qur’anic verses that encourage 
enrichment.145 It was proven that the Islamic world in the 10th century was more 
developed than Western Europe. The latter had caught up by approximately the 17th or 
18th centuries, advancing faster than the former. This shows that Islam is consistent with 
both long periods of relatively rapid and slow growth. Lewis had identified two potential 
roots cause—intellectual and sociological.146 According to him, between the 9th and 10th 
centuries, the gate of consensus building (ijtihad) among Muslim intellect was closed. 
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They seem to be satisfied that all the answers were already available. There was no need 
for further inquiry. One just had to obey. In discussing the sociological roots of Islamic 
performance, Ibn Khaldun argued that Muslim societies were founded by nomadic 
warriors whose bands were characterized by intense group loyalty—once they settled 
down, their descendents surrendered to the vices of the cities and were replaced by 
another wave of tribesmen of greater social cohesion. This can be related to low 
motivation among the upper classes of socially immobile, especially slave-holding 
societies that could not provide the rational for development through intense means.147 
These reasons cannot be used to rationalize the economic underachievement of Islamic 
society as Malaysia’s case has proven otherwise. Hence, I will examine the settings that 
influence Malaysia’s economic growth by tracing the evolution of its development 
policies. 
D. ISLAM AND MALAYSIA’S ECONOMIC GROWTH 
1. Malaysia’s Growth Models 
Malaysia’s economy is influenced by a global and national context that became a 
liability as well as an asset for development. During the pre-independence and the first 
two decades following it, Malaysia’s economy was based on exports of natural resources 
mainly rubber, tin and palm oil. This “over-specialized economy,” however, was subject 
to strong export-induced fluctuations, depleting natural deposits, and too dependent on a 
single crop whose continued viability was being threatened by competition from a 
synthetic substitute.148 Malaysia then diversified its economy through manufacturing, 
industrialization and services. When the economy became globalized, Malaysia strove to 
compete and prepare itself for a common goal of becoming an industrialized nation by 
year 2020. Furthermore, Malaysia had heterogeneous societies with a pattern of ethnic 
cleavage significantly among the Malays, Chinese, and Indians who differed sharply in 
culture, religion, patterns of occupation and income level. They co-existed peacefully 
during the British era but after independence, they had to interact more and were forced 
to work together to build the nation. Fortunately, these liabilities were compensated by 
existing conditions favorable for development. Ethnic harmony was successfully 
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maintained in a coalition aimed at resolving conflicts of group interests, inheritance of a 
strong physical and administrative infrastructure, and favorable ratio between land and 
natural resources to the population.149  
The balance between assets and liabilities was successfully attained by strong 
economic performance from 1957 to 1969. The national GDP increased by 86% and a 
higher rate of growth between 8 and 10%.150  By that time, however, such an increase did 
not contribute equally to economic growth or benefit the people equally. Although 
politically dominant, the Malay-Muslims were relatively poor due to low-productivity 
agriculture while the Chinese were the most prosperous group as they led in seeking 
economic opportunities, were urbanized and well educated. The Indians were less well 
off than the Chinese but better off than the Malays.  
The government (led by the Malays) realized that income inequality has affected 
the majority of poor rural Malay supporters and actively promoted programs to provide 
economic benefits. Some of these actions were taken quietly, funded by taxes gained 
from a Chinese and foreign businesses as an open discussion would be inflammatory. The 
result was a shrinking economy that subsequently led to major riots in May 1969. The 
government has learned that development should resume in a manner consistent with 
ethnic harmony to avoid such violence from recurring. Two schools of thought have 
emerged among the Chinese and the Malays.151 Most of the Chinese were in favor of 
pro-growth and argued that though in the long run it would have benefited the Malays—
full employment, higher wages, and drawing them to a non-agriculture sector was the 
most feasible way to improve their economy and at the same time other races could 
benefit from the economic growth. Others propose the necessary direct intervention in the 
economy, if need be at the cost of economic growth. The intervention is in those parts 
traditionally monopolized by the Chinese and foreigners such as ethnic employment 
quotas, reservation for stocks issues, and the creation of Malay entrepreneurship, Malay-
foreign joint ventures, and public sector ownership. In 1970, a 20-year NEP, an 
affirmative action which favored the Malays, was introduced. However, it had to be 
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extended and renamed as the New Development Policy (NDP) as the achievement of the 
Malays still lagged behind. With the Vision 2020, the Malay-Muslims leaders have 
envisioned Malaysia to be a fully developed nation as long as racial harmony can be 
sustained. 
As the issue of political stability, a major criterion for growth, has been dealt 
with, Malaysia prepared a tangible plan for growth. Under the British rule, Malaya was 
an enclave economy with a dualistic structure for almost 100 years. A large part of this 
economy was controlled by the British capital invested in rubber plantations, tin mining, 
and timber extraction mainly for exports. Most of the labors in these activities were the 
Chinese and Indian migrants. The other part of this economy was agriculture production 
and fishing, mainly for consumption in rural and urban areas. These activities were 
conducted by the Malays or the indigenous non-Malay communities. There were almost 
no large-scale industries. The Chinese largely controlled the small-scale processing 
industries, trade, and services. Based on the economic structure, the Malays were the 
poorest when compared to the Chinese and Indians. British administration adopted laissez 
faire trade policy with emphasis on law and order and maintained macroeconomic 
stability. The rental and export income generated were used for law and order and to 
build infrastructure for the economy to be profitable.152  
The decline in rubber and tin prospects, economic instability, and severe political 
and demographic pressures required the Malaysian economy to be diversified from 1947 
until 1970, which gave West Malaysia one of the highest standards of living in Asia.153 
This diversification of economic activities is part of the overall objectives of development 
planning for rapid economic growth, a lower degree of economic instability, greater 
employment opportunities, and a more equitable distribution of income and wealth. The 
evaluation on the diversification programs in relations to the existing and set objectives 
indicates an unfavorable conclusion. The unemployment problem has worsened and no 
significant improvement in the economic position of the Malays.154 This observation 
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supports Collier’s argument that among the risk factors to conflicts are a lack of 
alternative economic opportunities and ethnic dominance.155 Collier’s argument reflected 
Malaysia’s experience of racial riots. Malaysian government has responded with a good 
pragmatic policy for redistribution and growth.       
Malaysia’s real GDP grew annually at an average of 6.6% from 1955 to 2000.156 
The ratio of private investment to the GDP rose from 9% in 1950 to nearly 20% in the 
90s. There was a significant structural change due to the growth process. Agriculture was 
important in the 1950s in terms of its contribution to GDP and use of labor, but it has 
become less important today. Manufacturing and exports have taken the lead to the 
overall growth rate. The trade composition has changed from dependence on the export 
of primary goods to manufactured goods and foreign trade has become more important. 
The annual inflation rate was kept low, between 1 to 5%, except in the 1970s when it rose 
to 6%. There was a budget surplus in the second half of the 1950s and a negligible deficit 
in the 1990s.  Domestic savings increased from about a quarter of the GDP in the 1960s 
to 40% in the 1990s. Foreign direct investments rose from 3% in 1970s to 6% in 1990s. 
In 1970, almost one half of the population lived in poverty, but the proportion of the poor 
is only 8% in 2000.157 The quality of life of Malaysian has improved.158  
Malaysia’s growth experience can be divided into three phases—market led 
development strategy, state-led strategy, and Malaysia incorporated.159 From 1957 to 
1970, the government adopted a market-led development strategy. The government 
continued the colonial laisez faire policy for industry, but intervened extensively to 
promote rural development and provide social and physical infrastructure. The 
intervention biased the Malays in rural areas where investment was directed to agriculture 
and rural development, and public sector agencies were used for land development. The 
government did not intervene in industry policy, respecting the implied social contract 
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that the Malay would lead the political role while the Chinese control the industry and 
commerce. Import substitution was promoted, but did not pursue a strong protectionist 
policy that can penalize the primary product sector. The policy is aimed at reducing 
dependency on import consumer goods, promoting the use of domestic resources, and 
creating employment opportunities.  
From 1971 to 1985, the approach of development was changed to a state-led 
strategy. The NEP was introduced to eradicate poverty and restructure the society to 
redress economic imbalances between ethnic groups.160 Two major targets were set for 
20 years.  First, the Malays would manage and own at least 30% as compared to 2.4% in 
1970, of the total commercial and industrial activities by 1990.  Second, employment at 
all levels and in all sectors particularly the modern urban sectors, had to reflect the ethnic 
composition of the population. To achieve the ownership target, a policy of 
nationalization was introduced in buying out and restructuring the equity of foreign-held 
companies and establishing trust companies for the Malays.  
From 1986 to 2000, Malaysia incorporated was introduced involving the 
liberalization and privatization policies due to a major recession in the 1980s.161 
Economic experts saw it as a pragmatic approach to face the economic difficulty.162 The 
government halted the process of restructuring the society, while the share of the Malays 
under NEP in corporate capital, employment, education and training increased. The focus 
was wealth creation, shifting policies to revive the economic growth through investment, 
particularly the private sector. These policies were designed to slow down the Chinese 
business interests and to induce foreign investment. In 1991, the NEP was extended with 
some modifications for another 10 years and was renamed the New Development Policy 
(NDP). The new policy switched the government approach toward supporting the Malays 
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through initiatives geared to entrepreneurship, managerial expertise, and skill 
development. A firm commitment to an open-trade system continues, and the market 
oriented policy reforms were accompanied by a strong focus on restoring and maintaining 
macroeconomic stability.  
In the early 1980s, prior to the Malaysian incorporation, Malaysia seriously 
became involved in industrialization when the First Industrial Master Plan (IMP) for 
1986 to 1995 was launched under the government sponsorship. Malaysia’s late 
industrialization policy was due to comparative advantage in the production of primary 
commodities. Historically, Malaysia made a modest start in industrialization in 1968, 
when it passed the Investment Incentives Act to encourage manufacturing for exports to 
replace the import substitution strategy of previous years.163 Two kinds of industries 
were prominent in those years: resource-based (processing of rubber and oil palm) and 
non-resource-based (electrical and electronics). The latter mostly provided new jobs and 
foreign exchange earnings and government revenue but made use of much imported 
inputs. Hence, “value-added” was small as it did not contribute much toward economic 
growth. Nevertheless, Malaysia was able to compete with other manufacturers of these 
products, until recently. The next move by the government was to venture into heavy 
industries, such as steel, car manufacturing, and cement. Malaysia believed that labor-
intensive industries were not consistent with rising labor costs. The only way to generate 
faster economic growth was to go hi-tech and thus, the national car project was borne in 
Malaysia. The project has many spin-offs and generated a lot of inter-related 
industries.164 
In the mid-1997, Malaysia’s economic growth was halted by the financial crisis. 
The crisis, which developed in the financial markets quickly spread to the real economy 
(that produced real goods and services). In September 1998, Malaysia implemented 
another pragmatic policy—a widely criticized currency control. Yet these controls in 
effect saved the economy and set it back on track for recovery because it has successfully 
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isolated the economy and halted the capital flight.165 It allowed Malaysia to implement 
its National Economic Recovery Plan (NERP), monetary policies designed to rejuvenate 
the economy, free from external influences. From data released by Bank Negara on 
second quarter growth, the Malaysian economy can be said to have fully recovered from 
the crisis of 1997/98, with a real GDP growth rate approaching 10% for 2000.166 Over 
the year, on the back of the growth is the manufacturing sector, particularly in the 
electronics sector, as well as the higher crude oil price. 
In the history of Malaysia’s development since independence, the present models 
of growth were successfully implemented with adaptations to respond to crises. The 
models were based on an export-oriented, imported-factor driven economy, with the 
government sector playing an alternative facilitative or interventional role depending on 
the socio-political circumstances of the period as in 1965-1985 when it was active and 
1986 onward when government was reversing the process. Despite successful models, the 
growth was affected by political stability, except for a major racial riot in 1969 and few 
isolated cases of communal tensions in 1987 and 2000, which the government has 
successfully controlled.167 
2. Growth Model for the 21st Century? 
For the 21st century, Malaysia had the Third Outline Perspective Plan 2001-2010 
(OPP3), and the Eighth Five-Year Malaysia Plan, 2001-2005. However, to achieve its 
2020 Vision, Malaysia has yet to implement a viable growth plan.168 The slowdown of 
the world economy will effect slow growth and we will see whether Malaysia’s economy 
can sustain a long-term growth trend of 7% to 8% over the ten-year period of the OPP3. 
Malaysia must adapt to the new globalization and the new economy. A renown local 
economist has suggested a model that is based on a productivity push through economic 
reform that requires adjustments economy-wide that will have a better growth in the next 
decade.169 The assumption is that Malaysia’s economic future is inevitably linked to her 
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exploiting the opportunities and managing such changes. In the current environment of 
continuous change, firstly Malaysia must de-emphasize planning. The five-year plan 
mechanism is abolished and the OPP should be the main policy instrument 
complemented with the annual budget. Then, new competencies at the government, the 
firm, the household and the individual levels are needed. The competencies required 
strong domestic institutions and its development can be obtained by the inculcation of 
values—the most crucial is knowledge. Knowledge promotes innovation, which in turn 
will rely on the growth of enterprise in an economic, social and political environment. 
Policy orientation should avoid specifications of targeted outcomes but be flexible 
enough to adapt to external changes. The government’s role in the economy should be 
reviewed. The emphasis of government should be shifted toward ensuring social justice 
in development, and should provide incentives and infrastructure.  
From the government’s perspective, Malaysia has recognized its vulnerability and 
to some extent there is a move to diversify exports and to create different revenue 
streams.170 Besides a tourist destination, which contributes US $11 billion annually, 
Malaysia wants to establish itself as a center for computer science, education, and 
healthcare services. There is significant activity among the IT companies such as 
financial IT solutions, internet systems, web-based software, tele-medicine, or IT 
education systems. Real estate is another way the country has tried to gain an alternative 
revenue base. Malaysia is also promoting itself as an alternative destination for higher 
education. Facing great challenges from global economic uncertainty, the government’s 
good track record shows it can undertake various initiatives that improve productivity and 
facilitate economic growth-initiatives that do not require natural resources.171 To achieve 
these goals, pragmatism, infrastructure, services, industry and a good work ethic are 
clearly required. 
3. Malaysia’s Economic Islamization  
Malaysia, like most Muslim countries, has implemented some economic 
Islamization policies. The most prominent is the Islamic banking or Profit-Loss-Sharing 
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Banking (PLS). The concepts of modern Islamic banking date back to the mid 1940s. 
Models for Islamic banking appeared in Pakistan in the mid-1950s, but comprehensive 
and detailed concepts for interest-free banking only appeared in Egypt from 1963 to 
1967.172 The second Islamic Conference of Foreign Ministers in 1973 adopted a 
document on the “Institution of an Islamic Bank, Economics and Islamic Doctrines.” In 
1974, the Islamic Development Bank (IDB) was established as a result of this conference 
and the member states of the OIC became its members. Since 1974, the IDB helped to 
establish a number of Islamic banks in various Muslim and non-Muslim countries, such 
as in Dubai, Sudan, Egypt, Jordan, Bahrain and in Luxembourg in 1980. Today, there are 
more than a hundred financial institutions that claim to be operating partially or fully on 
an interest-free basis in 34 countries.173  
In Malaysia, Islamic banking first emerged in the form of financial institution 
developed for the pilgrims of Malaysia.174 To help Muslims save enough money without 
involving interest, the Pilgrims Savings Corporation was set up in 1962 and became 
operational in 1963. It was later incorporated into the Pilgrims Management Fund Board 
in 1969. The corporation managed the savings of Muslims intending to perform the Hajj 
pilgrimage and to improve their economy. The objectives were to enable Muslims to save 
money gradually, to perform the Hajj or other beneficial expenses, to enable Muslims, 
through the use of their savings, to partake in capital investments actively, which are 
halal (permissible) to Islam, and to provide protection, supervision and welfare to the 
Hajj pilgrims.175  
Under the enactment of the Islamic Banking Act (IBA) in 1983, the first Islamic 
bank in Malaysia, Bank Islam Malaysia Berhad (BIMB) was established. BIMB with a 
paid-up capital of RM 100 million and an authorized capital of RM 500 million carried  
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out its activities on an interest-free basis. BIMB was described as the “first step in the 
government's efforts to instill Islamic values into the country's economic and financial 
systems as a replacement for the current Western-base economic system.”176 
Syarikat Takaful Malaysia Berhad (Takaful Malaysia), incorporated in 1984, was 
then established with an authorized capital of RM 500 million and a paid-up capital of 
RM 55 million. It has been converted into a public listed company on the Kuala Lumpur 
Stock Exchange (KLSE) since 1996. A subsidiary company of BIMB, other major 
shareholders of Takaful Malaysia includes the Islamic Religious Councils and Baitulmals 
of some states and Amanah Saham Bank Islam (ASBI). The company objectives are to 
provide takaful services (Islamic Insurance) at the highest standard of efficiency and 
professionalism to all Muslims and the population of Malaysia.177 
Besides banking, economic Islamization covers zakat (Islamic tax) collection. The 
Pusat Pungutan Zakat (PPZ) or Zakat Collection Center was established by the Federal 
Territory Islamic Council, Kuala Lumpur (known as MAIWP) in 1991. PPZ uses a 
corporate style of management by setting up a council of a company called the Hartasuci 
Private Limited. PPZ's responsibility is to collect zakat for the council and the 
redistribution is done by other agencies of the council. PPZ informs the public about 
zakat and the responsibility of the payers, to help the payers, both individuals and 
companies, calculate their zakat so that the zakat collection can be increased. The PPZ’s 
guiding philosophy is to make the zakat payers feel that the payment is worshipping—to 
purify their wealth and soul, and to feel satisfaction and relief. PPZ relies more on 
educating the Muslim public as opposed to using force or the law because self awareness 
is more effective and appealing to the educated public.178  
Another aspect of economic Islamization in Malaysia is the empowerment of 
Muslim women. Although this particular issue has prompted prominent debates over the 
years between the government and the Islamic opposition party, Muslim women in 
Malaysia received fair treatment from the government. Malaysian women are highly 
important contributors to the country’s economic growth. Their access to health and 
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education and their participation in the economy have increased rapidly over the years. 
From 1990 to 1995, for example, the female labor force participation rate has been 
between 44 and 46 percent.179 In 1995, Malaysia reaffirmed its commitment to improve 
the status of women at the United Nations Fourth World Conference on Women. 
Malaysia has implemented the National Policy on Women in order to involve them more 
in decision making, safeguard their well-being, remove discrimination, and ensure access 
to and benefits from development. Malaysia also allows active women involvement in 
organizations. For example, “Qur’an and Woman,” a discussion of the Qur’an from a 
feminist point written by Amina Wadud Muhsin was first published in Malaysia in 1992. 
It is presently used as a manifesto by the Sisters in Islam (SIS) movement in Malaysia.180 
SIS was established as a working group of Muslim feminist intellectual activists in 1988 
and was officially registered in 1993, with a mission, “to promote the development of 
Islam in Malaysia that upholds the principles of equality, justice and democracy,” which 
also takes on broader gender-related concerns and questions that relate specifically to 
Muslim women. Through their publications, letter-writing campaigns, awareness 
generating forums and other activities, SIS has raised the level of awareness over issues 
related to Islam and Muslim women’s right in the country and beyond.181 Living in a 
healthy environment, Muslim women in Malaysia enjoy relative social justice. They 
represent an important workforce in the country that contributes to economic growth.  
E. CONCLUSION 
Issue on Islamic economic system remains contentious. There are debates among 
Muslims and non-Muslims regarding this system whether there is an Islamic economy 
even exists. The fact is that there are general regulatory and conceptual authoritative texts 
on the Islamic economy in the Qur’an. However, there is no evidence either in the Quran 
or the Prophet’s traditions, which suggest a hierarchy of Islamic economic values. There 
are also concepts of Islamic hisba that guide Muslims government to regulate the 
economy as well as ethical governance. These concepts have been interpreted by 
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Muslims scholars that Islamic economy envisioned social justice in an Islamic society as 
well as impacting all human concepts of life and their interactions in politics, 
worshipping, and social systems. The core beliefs and teachings of Islam reflect certain 
values of equality although arguing whether Muslims live up to these teachings is moot, 
as evidenced in real life.  
In reality, the tangible practice of an Islamic economic system is only limited to 
interest-free banking. The limits on the discourse are difficult to comprehend as why 
interest alone has taken center-stage. Other aspects of an Islamic economy such as issues 
of distributive justice, prohibition of extravagance, exploitation, equality and fairness, 
discrimination and welfare are ignored or marginalized. Economic Islamization efforts in 
some Muslim countries have failed as someone blamed the west and corruption, while 
many were skeptical about its future because of the current global economic structure and 
interdependencies have made local norms irrelevant.   
Some argue that Islamic guiding principles benefited non-Muslims in the free-
market economies as there are no significant differences between Islam and secular 
economic system. Government’s actions following the concept of maslahah—either to 
intervene in the market, to redistribute income, to set minimum wage, to expropriate 
private property or exchange control—is to ensure economic development and to avoid 
instability. According to the UNDP report, political upheavals, conflicts, sanctions and 
embargoes have affected many Muslim economies, causing declines in productivity and 
disrupting markets. The impact of war is slow growth, damaged infrastructure, social 
fragmentation and public sector stagnation.182  
Studies on whether Islam has affected economic growth show a positive 
relationship: Islam promotes growth. In Malaysia, however, studies on development at 
the sub-national level find that there is no robust relationship between specific religious 
affiliations and national economic performance. Eventually, Malaysia’s redistribution of 
wealth that favors the Malays promotes growth that benefits other ethnic groups. Since 
1969, there have been no serious ethnic schisms that could lead to instability or could 
hinder economic growth. Malaysia’s recipe for growth since independence has consisted 
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of political stability, good policies—economy diversification from the export of natural 
resources to industrialization, positive affirmative action for the distribution of wealth, 
government rational economic intervention and Malaysian incorporation—and 
pragmatism. For the new millennium, Malaysia’s growth model has yet to be realized. 
However, the government had taken aggressive actions to response to the changing 
economic situation by diversifying exports and creating different revenue streams. 
Malaysia’s implementation of Islamic economy can significantly be seen through 
the establishment of Islamic banking, the management of zakat collection, and the 
empowerment of women. Islamic banking was first established in the 1960s in the form 
of a corporation that helped Muslims save money for pilgrimage as well as for economic 
purposes. Islamic banks and institutions were then expanded to cater to the growing 
needs of interest free-banking as well as the management of zakat collection. Zakat 
management is important as it encourages worshipping while increasing the number of 
payers who determine the increase of collections, which can be redistributed for religious 
and economic activities.  
Muslim women in Malaysia play an important role in economic growth. The 
conditions that guaranteed freedom and justice have encouraged them to pursue 
education for empowerment and filling competitive positions in both public and private 
sectors. In sum, the Islamic economic system is rather well-established in Malaysia and 
its structure really interacts with politics for stability, social justice for redistribution of 
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V. ISLAM AND DEVELOPMENT: A COMPARATIVE 
ANALYSIS OF MUSLIM SOCIETIES IN ASIA  
A. INTRODUCTION 
Originating in Arabia in the early 7th century, Islam has now become a world 
religion. Muslims have traditionally divided the world into Dar al-Islam (countries where 
Islam rules) and Dar al-Harb (countries at war with Dar-al-Islam). Dar al-Ahad (the 
Land of Pact) emerged as Muslims were indecisive about Muslims minorities living 
permanently in non-Muslim states because some nations recognized a third division, 
called Dar al-Ahad.183 Dar al-Ahad refers to the countries that have diplomatic 
agreements and covenants with the Muslim nation. While Islam is commonly recognized 
as a Middle Eastern religion, the majority of Muslims live in Asia: Indonesia, 
Bangladesh, Pakistan, and India, for example, are the most populous Muslim societies.184 
From the late 13th to 15th centuries, conquering tribesmen, traveling merchants and the 
sufis brought Islam from the Middle East and converted new peoples to form Islamic 
societies in inner Asia, Afghanistan, India, and the Malay Archipelagos.185 The influence 
of Malay sultanates later diffused Islam to Borneo Island and the Philippines. By the 17th 
century, Islamic societies were fully institutionalized in much of Asia.186   
In Asia, Islam plays a diverse role in public life. Malaysia and Indonesia can be 
considered partly Dar al-Islam, as Muslims are politically dominant, but they must 
accommodate non-Muslims with religion and cultural pluralism. Both countries, 
however, have a different approach in addressing Islam and development. Conventional 
wisdom assumes that Islam is unfit to transform a developing country into a modern state 
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that transcends a narrow-minded religious outlook. Muslim states are also perceived as 
treating non-Muslim citizens as less than equal; curbing their access to power and 
religious freedom while in secular democratic states, religious minorities face 
discrimination.187   
In Malaysia, the policy of “inclusion of Islam” in development has proved 
workable whereas in Indonesia the policy of “exclusion of Islam” is not as successful as 
the former.188 In both states, the constitutions have guaranteed minority rights and 
religious freedom. In the case of India, despite being democratic, there are more serious 
questions about the ability of the Muslims minority to live within the state.  While the 
Indian constitution also guarantees the rights of minorities, Muslims have claimed that its 
implementation does not give them great prospects for development. They have limited 
choices in pursuing Islamic ideals and are constrained by the non-Muslim majority’s 
governing inclination as well as internal diversions in choosing either to live in Dar al-
Islam (Pakistan) or Dar al-Ahad (India). Furthermore, the growing influence of Hindu 
Nationalism, which espouses the idea of Hindu statehood, is further deteriorating 
religious harmony.  
The purpose of this chapter is to analyze the impact of Islam on the wide ranging 
issues of development in Muslim and non-Muslim states with Muslims minorities. I 
compare Malaysia to Indonesia and India, which in varying degrees have certain 
similarities. All three were secular (although Malaysia claims to be an Islamic state), 
ethnically heterogeneous, possess diversity, and share the complexity of Islamic life, but 
they were different in embracing Islam and economic development. I believe that 
Malaysia is successful because Islam is included in its development and foreign policy 
agenda. The exclusion of Islam, especially in India and Indonesia, where Muslims are the 
major stakeholders, inhibits them from being as successful as Malaysia. I examine how 
Islam presents itself in the public life of Asian Muslims, and how Islam influences 
development. I also examine the political and socio-economic ideology of the respective 
countries. 
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B. INCLUSION OF ISLAM IN DEVELOPMENT 
Postcolonial Muslim leaders have different versions of development because 
some were western oriented and others were committed to creating Islamic states due to 
their skepticism about the compatibility of Islam and modernity. For Malaysia, an 
ethnically heterogeneous country, the constitutional victory of Islam after independence 
is reflected in its institutionalization of Islam as the official religion, which thereby 
safeguarded the Muslim Malays’ ideology and political supremacy. Malaysia claims to be 
an Islamic state, but nevertheless, Malaysia is less assertive in its approach than other 
Islamic states. Malaysia has adopted a western development model but seeks to establish 
a moral order inspired by Islamic principles. 
After the racial riot of 1969, Malaysia adopted, reinforced, and further 
institutionalized the Bumiputera-centric ideology that witnessed a slow but steady 
advancing of national consciousness.189 The country’s continuous stable ethnic relations, 
partly due to harsh imposition of the Internal Security Act (ISA) against the former 
communist insurgents and instigators of racial sentiments, are important in helping the 
government to overcome the economic and political crises that impede growth. Despite 
being pro-Bumiputera and imposing harsh restrictions on political and civil rights, 
Malaysia demonstrates that Islam can be compatible with modernization.  
After inheriting a stable government in 1981, Prime Minister Mahathir 
significantly transformed Malaysia into one of the most successful developing economies 
in Asia. In his era, Malaysia made the most radical ideological readjustment since 
independence.190 The pro-Islamic government pledged support for Islamization and 
mobilized a promising Malaysian nationalism. Islam was incorporated in the national 
vision through a flexible and pragmatic interpretation and by rationalizing the principles 
of Islamic universalism. The practicality of these principles laid the foundation of the 
Islamic inclusive ideology in a newly emerging Bangsa Malaysia (the Malaysian nation)  
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since the late 1980s. This marked the departure from Bumiputera-centric policies to a 
multi-ethnic, global approach, and was paralleled by the government’s Islamization 
commitment at the national and international levels.191 
The centralization of executives (the political and economic) under the Prime 
Minister is one of Malaysia’s success strategies.192 Since the late 1980s, increasing 
authoritarianism has reinforced UMNO’s dominance and has eroded the principle of the 
separation of powers and the Malay sultanates institution.  Malaysia survived the mid-
1980s’ recession and implemented industrial development and mega national projects. 
There was a concurrent institutionalization of the Islamic administration apparatus with 
an increasing number of government-employed ulama. The expanded religious 
bureaucracies further restrained free religion activities or public expression. This was in 
line with the national Islamization and modernization trends to steer the nation to a 
common destiny using a combination of modern and global elements and the Islamic 
indigenous element. The government’s vision was to make Malaysia economically and 
culturally developed although it seems that democracy has suffered.193  
Another strategy posed by Malaysia to propagate Islamic concepts was the 
provocative anti-imperialistic rhetoric against western powers based on the changing 
world order.194 This strategy was based on two assumptions—Malaysia’s rising position 
in the world economy and the growing tension between the west and the Muslim world.  
In the 1980s and 1990s, the rapidly developing Asian economies including Malaysia, a 
Muslim state, made Lee Kuan Yew and Mahathir advocate “Asian Values.” This 
philosophy argued that there was an Asian model that was uniquely different from the 
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western economic development models.195 The East Asia’s economic miracle and the 
issue of Islam versus the west helped to strengthen Mahathir’s strategy. With the public’s 
growing Islamic consciousness, he mobilized Malaysian Muslims’ anti–western feelings, 
and claimed he was acting as the guardian of Islam. Malay nationalism was ideologically 
channeled from the non-Malays within the country to the west outside. Together with the 
material benefits, it appealed to many Malaysians. 
The consequence of the socio-economic development had changed the culture of 
Muslims. The altering ethnic-based identity to a global one has resulted in a widespread 
middle-class symbolizes by consumerist and materialistic lifestyles.196 Despite being 
modern, however, they became far more self-consciously Islamic. This cultural 
orientation, at the state and societal levels, allow UMNO as well as progressive and 
modernist Muslim segments to interpret Islam in their own terms. For Malaysia’s 
conservatives and traditionalists like PAS, UMNO’s act was extremely radical.  
There are growing critics from PAS on UMNO’s concept of a modernist Islam. 
PAS has enjoyed growing support from the disenchanted, the poor and rural citizens. 
While PAS long aspired to establish an Islamic state, UMNO had a more secular 
outlook.197  UMNO’s version of progressive Islam made the non-Muslims, who feared 
the prospects of Malaysia becoming an Islamic state as envisioned by PAS, less 
suspicious of the increasing position of Islam in UMNO’s development policies.198   
With the help of political and socio-economic successes, UMNO’s response to the 
PAS was based on three credible ideological foundations: Islamic universalism, 
multiculturalism, and Islamic modernism.199 First, these ideologies elevated Islam to an 
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equal footing with the west, rejecting western domination and interference in their 
internal affairs. Second, it promoted an ethnically harmonious nation-state, giving an 
increasing number of non-Muslims participation in lucrative government contracts and 
access to the mainstream of national development. Third, it symbolized their strong belief 
in economic development and material strengths, a crucial element for defending Islam 
and national integrity. In 1992, the government-backed Malaysian Institute of Islamic 
Understanding (IKIM) was established. IKIM and other Islamic agencies have advocated 
UMNO’s version of modern and progressive Islam. It was followed by restructuring, in 
various degrees, of key Islamic institutions such as the Shari’a courts, mosques, religious 
schools, zakat collection, and religious officials. The Malaysian government plays a 
leading role in Islamization, advertising itself as a model of an Islamic nation-state. 
Malaysia’s inclusive approach of modernization rationalized under the three ideological 
foundations helped to mobilize broader nationalistic sentiments among the Malaysian 
population.  
C. EXCLUSION OF ISLAM IN DEVELOPMENT 
1.  Islam in Indonesia 
Indonesia is an archipelago nation with approximately 17,000 islands with over 
1,000 of them inhabited. The population of Indonesia is more than 210 million and 
consists of 300 ethnic groups.200  The wide range of ethnic groups are generally known 
as the “Malay Stock,” all distinguished from each others by language, social structure, 
occupation and religion.201 There is one national language, Bahasa Indonesia, a modern 
form of Malay, but many of the ethnic languages maintain their traditional role at the 
home, village and regional level. Indonesia has the greatest number of Muslims in the 
world, over 90% of the total population ascribes to Islam. The remainder of the 
population consists of six million Christians, 2.5 million Hindu Balinese, and smaller 
numbers of Buddhists and local mystical cults.202  
In the 13th century, Islam was introduced to the Indonesian society of Pasai, in 
north Sumatra by Arab and Indian traders, mostly Sufis, who bartered and traded their 
                                                 
200 Ibid., Othman bin Abdullah, Masters Thesis, 53. 
201 Anthony H. Johns, “Indonesia: Islam and Cultural Pluralism,” in John L. Esposito, eds., Islam in Asia: 
Religion, Politics & Society (New York: Oxford University Press, 1987), 202. 
202 Ibid. 
77 
goods for spices of the East Indies. This development was followed by Muslims’ control 
over the Indian Ocean trading system. In the 16th and the 17th centuries, Islam’s influence 
gradually spread to all areas of Indonesia.203 Islam, however, did not displace the existing 
cultural traditions that were mainly Hindu and Buddhist, as it was tolerant, pluralistic and 
non-coercive. This peaceful diffusion of Islam in Indonesia signifies a claim that “there is 
no evidence of foreign military expeditions imposing Islam by conquest in Indonesia.”204  
Indonesian Muslims are mainly Sunni from the Shafi’i school of law. They were 
divided into many Muslim communities that were loyal to respective regions and strongly 
influenced by pre-modern history.205 By the end of the 18th century, the world-wide ideas 
of Islamic reform ranging from Wahhabism, reformists, and modernists reached 
Indonesia. 206 These situations have inculcated greater variations between the scope and 
focus of Islamic responses. Adam Schwarz categorized the Javanese Islamic beliefs into 
abangan, santri, and priyayi.207 The abangan is the religious mixture of traditional 
mystical beliefs, Hindu-Buddhism and Islam. The santri is concerned more with Islamic 
principles, especially the moral and social interpretations that were intolerant with the 
traditional beliefs and practices. The priyayi is the aristocratic elite, which originally 
formed the Javanese kingdoms, but later became the bureaucrats and administrators. Both 
the abangan and santri were petty traders, merchants, and peasants. However, since 
independence, the bureaucracy has become accessible to other segments of the society. 
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During pre-independence Indonesia, Islamic characters were reflected in 
Indonesian politics and governance.208 Dutch colonization in the 19th century brought a 
western concept of nationalism and secularism to the region. The condition eventually 
helped the local secular and religious associations emerge. Notably, in 1908 a Javanese 
cultural organization, Budi Utomo (Noble Endeavor), which was secular and nationalistic 
in nature, was founded. In 1912, Muhammadiyya, an apolitical Muslim organization with 
reformist ideas, was founded in response to secularism that balanced between Qur’an 
scripture and civil law. To meet its needs, Muhammadiyya followed the western 
missionary organizations by founding its own network of schools, teachers’ colleges, 
hospitals, and orphanages. In the same year, Sarekat Islam (Islamic Federation), a 
political organization, was formed. The Sarekat rose from an organization known as the 
Islamic Traders’ Federation that aimed at improving facilities and opportunities for local 
traders. In 1922, Sarekat Islam broke into the left wing, which became the Indonesian 
Communist Party (PKI) and the Islamic wing, which became the Islamic political party, 
Partai Serikat Islam Indonesia (PSII). In 1926, the Nahdlatul Ulama (NU or the revival 
of the ulama), the Muslim traditionalists, was formed in response to the undermining of 
the traditional authority of ulama by reformist movements. Both the PSII and NU remain 
as independent political parties.  
During World War II, the Japanese occupying force had planned for the 
emergence of an independent Indonesia as part of Japan’s long-term planning of the 
Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere. They actively courted Islamic groups by 
exploiting Muslim-anti Dutch feelings, drawing the Muslim groups into the 
administration, establishing a Department of Religious Affairs, and training Muslim 
militias against the Allied invasion.209 To keep control of the potential danger from 
Islamic groups, however, they created a unified Muslim political federation known as 
Masyumi (Consultative Council of Indonesian Muslims) in 1943. 
Indonesia gained its independence in 1945. Under the leadership of President 
Soekarno, Muslims’ influence in national politics declined due to the government’s 
oppression, the collapse of santri businesses, and the rejection of political Islam by some 
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Javanese.210 NU remained active in the anti-communist network that consisted of the 
banned Masyumi members, modernists youth organizations, conservative nationalists and 
the armed forces. Thus, despite having the greatest Muslim populations, Indonesia is not 
an Islamic state. Islam is not a state religion and although there are Muslim political 
parties, they are not influential enough to convert the nation to a purely Islamic state.  
In 1965, PKI attempted a coup to overthrow the government. The political turmoil 
forced Soekarno to relinquish his powers and the political parties were marginalized. 
Islam played a central role in defeating the PKI in 1966, paving the way for a military 
coalition headed by General Suharto to secure power in 1967. However, as a political 
force, Islam was sidelined in the New Order regime under President Suharto.  
Under the New Order and subsequent regimes, Islam was disproportionately 
discredited in the development of Indonesia. Such action conformed to the existence of 
political and ideological discourse, which centered on the division between two 
institutions—the nationalists and the Islamists.211 The Nationalists (government) argued 
that a society based on religions, ethnicity, regional and class affiliations would not be 
capable of moving forward as an economically strong nation.212 Islamists (secular-
modernizers, moderate social democrats, Javanese mystical groups and NU) were 
accused of being sectarian and advocating an anti-state ideology despite NU’s claim that 
Islam is compatible with modern civilization.   
Both assumptions resulted in a political controversy, which led to an unfinished 
debate over some form of formal link between Islamic ideology and the state, and those 
in favor of the five principles of Pancasila as the ideological foundation of the state.213 
Many Muslim modernists that hoped for Islam to be stipulated in the state’s constitution 
were disappointed by its exclusion in favor of the Pancasila. Even though the Pancasila 
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first principle is related to religion, which states “believe in one god,” it does not codify 
the implementation of Shari’a. The statement of believe in one god with the obligation 
for adherents of Islam to implement the Shari’a remain politically contentious.214 In fact, 
Muslims cannot implement the Shari’a as the government argued that religious 
allegiance is irrelevant to citizenship—all, regardless of faith and race, should receive 
equal administrative and financial support from the government. Suharto exemplified a 
strong secular-nationalist leadership backed by the armed forces (Angkatan Bersenjata 
Republic Indonesia or ABRI), particularly the Army, which assumed a dominant role in 
the state and society. It was the army that dictated the fundamental direction of the New 
Order’s state development and claimed to be the defender of the nation and territorial 
integration. Religion ranked low in the values of leadership since the government 
concentrated on holding power, stabilizing the economy and reaping the benefits of 
development itself. The integrationist national ideology further undermined the exclusion 
of Islam by rationalizing political Islam as a potential enemy within the national 
boundary.215  
Political Islam is neutralized in the political, ideological, and socio-economic 
spheres.216 Politically, activities of the four Islamic parties were integrated into the 
United Development Party (Partai Persatuan Pembangunan or PPP) in 1973.217 PPP’s 
opposition of the government-sponsored party, Golkar (Golongan Karya or functional 
group), always lacked coherence, which is undermined by individual component parties. 
In 1984, the government required all political parties and social and religious 
organizations to acknowledge the Pancasila as their sole ideological foundation. The 
government’s attempt to eliminate any promotion of Islamic ideology in Indonesia 
touched the sensitive issue of Shari’a implementation and eventually divided Muslims 
leadership. Economically, Muslims were marginalized especially under Suharto. Non-
Muslims—particularly Chinese and Christians—played significant roles in various fields 
both in the public and private sectors. Certain Christians held pre-dominant positions in 
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the bureaucracy, military, and education institutions while the Chinese who were 
connected to the government built large business empires and became partners in 
government projects. Internationally, Indonesia maintained its un-Islamic stance, which 
was reflected by a non-religious practicality of foreign policy. Indonesia’s international 
priority was economic development based on important relations with western countries. 
Indonesia’s role in the Islamic world was marginal as Suharto was less interested in 
issues of the Islamic world.   
Although Indonesia repressed Islam politically, it did not hinder the socio-cultural 
activities of the Muslims. Once the leadership was satisfied that Islam no longer 
influenced politics, they provided massive infrastructural support, particularly in 
education and social welfare.218 The policy led to a significant Islamization in the state 
and society: Islamic education was expanded; many modernist Muslims replaced the 
dominant abangan Muslims in the bureaucracy; the government’s non-interventionist 
approach led many institutions, which were governed by private actors; and the Islamic 
revival, as experienced by Malaysia, penetrated into the Golkar and ABRI. As a result, in 
the 1980s, Indonesia made a political realignment through the leadership’s 
rapprochement with influential Muslim communities. The government created a flexible 
conservative Islam by stimulating the growth of pro-democracy Islam and created an 
ideology of tolerance.219 In 1990, the government blessed the foundation of the 
Association of Indonesian Muslim Intellectuals (Ikatan Cendekiawan Muslim Se-
Indonesia or ICMI) that allied Muslims professionals, Islamic figures, and the 
government. ICMI, under the leadership of B.J. Habibie, Suharto’s cabinet minister, gave 
hope to Muslims professionals who were deprived under the exclusivist policy of gaining 
favors from the government. Habibie built an enormous clientele, mostly urban Muslim 
professionals, within the state and private businesses, and a patronage of Islamic 
institutions network.  
The adjustment, however, did not greatly change the fundamental policy of a 
highly centralized and uneven distribution of upward social mobility as the capital 
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accumulation continued to favor the limited elite.220 The downfall of ICMI, in line with 
Suharto’s regime in 1998, proved the organization’s foundation and ideological 
weaknesses. The consequences were growing tension between the Muslims and the non-
Muslims. While the Muslims felt that they were deprived in politics and economy, the 
Chinese on the other hand, were not properly treated as national citizens. After the 1997 
financial crisis, the ethno-religious imbalance had created violent conflicts, which 
centered on anti-Christians and anti-Chinese sentiments.221  
The regime change under President Abdurrahman Wahid, a Muslim and leader of 
NU, brought about political liberalization.222 Wahid symbolized the possibility of 
economic and political reform and the rising of political Islam and activist movements. 
Several new political parties emerged and modernist Muslims formally voiced their terms 
regarding their Islamic vision of a new order. While some Islamic parties advocated 
Shari’a law, others under the Muhammadiyya and NU banners remained with the secular-
nationalists. Wahid assured the people that Indonesia should remain committed to the 
secular-nationalist principles. However, Wahid’s removal from the presidency 
represented a significant setback for the Islamic parties and organizations that wished to 
participate in and influence Indonesian politics. Their cause would not be easy.223 His 
leadership and reform ineffectiveness eroded the confidence of the Muslim parties.  
President Megawati, who inherited the secular-nationalist principle, struggled to 
recover from the 1998 financial crisis, political instability and separatism. She faced 
several competitors from the Islamic parties, the most prominent being Amien Rais, the 
leader of Muhammadiyya because Rais did not favor her as a replacement for Wahid.224 
Megawati further brushed the Islamic forces to the side-line of the state’s structure. The 
integrationist ideology of Pancasila, therefore, excluded Islam from the formal channels 
of influences. 
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2.  Islam in India 
India has 80 million Muslims or about 12% of its total population representing the 
third largest Muslim community in the world, after Indonesia and Pakistan. Before the 
partition of Pakistan, Muslims formed 24% of the population. After the partition and after 
Bangladesh was established, Muslims in south Asia were almost equally divided among 
the three states. In India, except in the state of Jammu and Kashmir and in the Union 
Territory of Lakshdweep, Muslims do not form a majority.225 Despite this fact, their 
influence on the Indian societies is strong. 
The process of converting Indians to Islam began in the 8th century by the Arabs 
invaders of northern India and Pakistan. From the 11th century, the spreaders of Islam in 
India, among others, were the Sufis and non-Arab Muslims of Bukhara, Turkey, Iran, 
Yemen and Afghanistan. The accepted assumption is that most Indian Muslims were 
converted to Islam through the sword.226 Most of the Muslim converts belonged to the 
lower classes of the Indian societies. There are also Muslims who belonged to the Hindu 
ruling families and the descendents of ruling Muslim invaders. These families brought to 
their kingdoms Muslim mercenaries, businessmen and slaves from abroad such as Russia, 
Afghanistan, Turkey, Arab countries, and Africa. Muslim Indians were generally divided 
into the Sunni and the Shi’a. Nevertheless, different communities adopted Islam in 
different ways bearing different names. In Kerala of south India, for example, the 
Mophilla community descends from Arab merchants while the Pathans are Muslims who 
arrived from Afghanistan, and the Nawait are descendents of Arab and Persian 
immigrants.227  
Before the British rule, there was no Indian identity by itself. Indians were 
distinguished by a decentralized and localized culture that is difficult to define. 
Hinduism, Buddhism, Jainism, Sikhism, and Islam coexisted rather easily.228 Even under 
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the Islamic Mughals, the early emperors, like Akbar, were inclusive in their rule and 
appointed some Hindu advisors. Due to the fragmented nature of ancient Hinduism, the 
successive invasions kept their tradition intact, as they tended to tolerate rather than to 
repel. Although clashes between Hindus and Muslims occurred, conflicts were centered 
on class or rivalry, rather than mutual distrusts.  
Despite ruling part of northern India for six centuries, Muslims now became the 
religious and language minority, living in a so-called Dar al-Harb situation. This 
significant twist of fate is related to the partition of Pakistan from British India. To gain 
independence from the British, Indian Muslim ulama joined the nationalist movement 
with the vision of a united India, jointly ruled by Hindus and Muslims. The ulama 
reflected Prophet Muhammad’s pact (ahad) with the Jews in Medina as the model and 
religious justification for sharing power with the Hindus.229 To them, India should be 
Dar al-Ahad.230 But in reality, many Muslims perceived India as Dar al-Kufr (Land of 
the Unbeliever) as the prospect of Dar al-Ahad were clouted by colonial policies, 
religious separatism, and the Indian Constitution.  
The British divide-and-rule policy started with the kings and princes who 
governed different regions without regard to religion. It was followed by the Hindu-
Muslim sectarian-chauvinist politics after the anti-colonial forces emerged in the late 19th 
and early 20th centuries.231 Muslims suspected of helping the 1857 Sepoy Revolt were 
discriminated again by the British who gave the advantage to the Hindus. The social 
division deepened when the British perceived Hindus and Muslims as distinct people. A 
mechanism to separate electorates based on religion was introduced in 1909. After 
independence in 1947, India’s constitution eliminated this feature and substituted it by 
general electorates so that members of all castes, religions, and communities could vote. 
By then, it was too late, as Islam had led to the partition.  
The partition led many Muslims to emigrate from northern India to Pakistan as 
well as Sikhs and Hindus to migrate in the opposite direction. This emigration caused an                                                  
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outflow of skilled human resources that weakened the economy, reduced the political role 
of Muslims, and disrupted the social structure of the Muslim community in India. As 
fellow Indians looked at the majority of the remaining Muslims with distrust, two Muslim 
classes were not affected by the partition: the influential landholding cultivators in the 
north and the traders in the south.232 For the rest of the minority, who were generally 
poor, their possible goals were either to assimilate or to integrate into the society, seeking 
autonomy, secession, or domination.233 Generally, in India, Muslims resist absorption, 
demand cultural autonomy, but reject secession, except for Pakistan and Kashmir.  
For both India and Pakistan, the Kashmiri issue is crucial in terms of religious and 
territorial integrity.234  India, a country held together by an ideology of unity in diversity, 
believes that a concession to religious separatism is likely to tear the secular structure 
apart. Most Indians fear a second partition [Kashmir] may affect the nation’s political 
resilience. Indians are proud of their plural, democratic society despite the country’s 
economic underdevelopment. Pakistan, on the other hand, sees Kashmir as the hallmark 
to prove that Muslims cannot be treated equally in Hindu-dominated country.  
To ease the religious separatism issue, the Indian secular-nationalist leaders 
drafted their constitution with the vision of a secular state that does not support Hinduism 
as a religion. Since more than 80% of the Indian population is Hindu, this concept 
challenged the sentiment for Hindu statehood even though India is heterogeneous and is a 
land of minorities. The constitution offers Muslims the opportunity to share power as 
legal equals with non-Muslims, not as rulers or servants: There is no discrimination on 
religious, language and caste grounds; equal opportunities exist as well as ensure the 
entry of the disadvantaged in public employment; they are free to manage their own 
religious affairs; and there is no compulsion to attend religious ceremonies.235 However, 
there are articles that many Muslims objected to on religious grounds: the state seeks to  
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secure a uniform civil code for all citizens; and the prohibition on the slaughter of cows. 
Even though the constitution provides Muslim minorities with equal opportunity and 
protection, in reality many perceive that there are gaps in its implementation.  
In the late 1980s, the impact of Hinduism on Indian politics was seen. The public 
increasingly supported Hindu nationalist parties. Then in the 1990s, the rise of Hindu 
nationalism produced a harsher anti-minority discourse in India. The Hindu-Muslim 
violence in Ayodhya in the state of Uttar Pradesh in 1992 and in the state of Gujarat in 
March 2002 marked the events that heightened the tensions.236  The consequence and 
cause of this disorder was a religious resurgence. The diverse religious and ethnic 
divisions in South Asia have produced fundamentalist movements that affect the events 
in India’s subcontinent such as Jamaati-Islami (Islamic Association), Hindu Nationalism, 
and Sikh Fundamentalism.237 Sikh Fundamentalism, however, limited only in the state of 
Punjab has largely been contained. 
Given the difficulty faced by Muslim minorities in India, they must tolerate the 
situations by having strategies and clear goals for their survival.  In the politico-religious 
sphere, Muslims were actively involved in elections, and were elected and nominated as 
cabinet ministers. In public services, they became governors and judges. Before 
independence, Muslims enjoyed disproportionately high representation in the legislatures, 
through the system of communal electorate and reserved seats. After independence, such 
advantages were lost owing to a re-shifting of common constituency’s elections, 
gerrymandering in the delimitation of constituencies, and exclusion from elections based 
on weak grounds.238 Muslim leadership had to adopt different strategies such as working 
closely with the ruling Congress Party, forming a Muslim Consultative Committee to 
choose credible Muslim candidates, or even choosing not to participate in politics.239 
Whatever the Muslims politicians, press, parties, and pressure groups have agitated for in 
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public life, however, does not reflect the Muslim masses but rather the northern Indian 
elite. Even the prevention of anti-Muslim violence does not receive a favorable response 
from the masses because they are preoccupied with individual physical and economic 
survival. Muslims have demanded non-interference in the Muslim personal law, which 
conflicts with the proposed introduction of a common civil law. This tends to produce a 
direct confrontation with the secular state. Even the Hindus who have sacrificed some of 
their religious customs resent the issue being politicized. 
In addition to losing politically, Muslims faced socio-economic discrimination. 
Job discrimination against Muslims is more persistent in the private sector, especially by 
large industrial and commercial enterprises with the exception of those Muslim 
owned.240 In public services, for example, Muslim representation is only 2 to 4% of the 
Muslim population.241 Muslim entrepreneurs fall victim to an anti-Muslim bias in 
securing government loans and permits, which is subject to bureaucratic discretion and 
corruption. Muslims have achieved some economic progress in cottage industries, but 
their goods and stores are often destroyed in communal riots. In education, Muslims 
enrollment at every level of education is low by proportion, even in areas with dense 
populations of Muslims. This is due to the lack of schools in Muslim areas, the neglect of 
Urdu and the imposition of Sanskrit, the prescription of non-secular books and Hindu 
religious rites in schools.242 The implication is that Muslims have less ability to be 
involved in politics, decision-making, business and the public sector.  
Additionally, the government’s economic policy has helped to deepen such 
inequality despite India’s economic growth. After more than fifty years of independence, 
India enjoyed an increase in its GDP and the economic growth rate, and advances in 
lifestyle and living standards. In 2002, India’s economy only grew 4.3%, but it was the 
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second fastest in the world after China while this year, it is expected to grow 7%.243 The 
growth came from a strong industry and agriculture, and a rise in local and foreign 
investments. Nonetheless, the increase was not due to the vast diversity of available local 
products but rather an increasingly overabundance of middle-class consumables.244 For 
millions of Indians, who have long been marginalized by caste or class, they are now 
demanding justice. The economic system, as well as widespread corruption by political 
and economic elites and growing social unrest have generated increasing disparities: 
under- and unemployment; deterioration of livelihoods; poverty; decline in trade union 
memberships; and an increase of workers in the informal sectors in the regular economy; 
and irregular employment.245 
Hence, India’s economic system is perceived to have excluded the Muslims and 
the poor majority of Indians. A decade after independence, India’s economy depended 
largely on industrialization, militarization, and later chemical-based agriculture. 
Following the 1950s, social reforms abolished landlordism, introduced a “reservations 
system” (affirmative action) for scheduled castes and tribes, and invested in 
telecommunications, basic industries and infrastructures.246 In addition, the first Five-
Year Plan (1950 to 1955) was launched for a greater social and economic welfare, which 
emphasized agriculture, cottage, and small and medium-size industries. Then, the second 
plan (1955 to 1960) was aimed at achieving higher standards of industry and agriculture. 
Over the short term, however, these policies increased inequality and uneven 
development.247  
Through the fifth plan (1970 to 1975) and onwards, the government responded 
with several poverty alleviation programs using the bureaucratic model of implementing 
“socialist” objectives. However, most of the top-down development policies produced 
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marginal benefits. The “Abolish Poverty” policy, for example, a pro-poor strategy aimed 
at curbing the power of the wealthy, was politically challenged by the middle and 
wealthy classes. The bureaucracies, to make it worse, were mostly represented by elites 
with high levels of political ties.248 The effect was reinforced dependency and corruption 
rather than widespread economic redistribution. Even though the lower classes’ 
participation in the economy has increased, their numbers are marginal. Up to 1990, the 
powerful urban and rural elites contributed little to the establishment of an egalitarian 
order—a dynamic and decentralized society and economy.249 In the advent of 
globalization, the government has initiated extensive economic policy reforms that allow 
a free-market economy to operate. In 1991, the New Economic Policy was introduced in 
conjunction with the IMF and the World Bank’s Structural Adjustment Programs (SAP) 
reforms. The economic, social and political consequences, among others, are higher 
prices of essential commodities, an increase in unemployment, a decrease in private-
sector employment due to computerization, and an increase in prices. By 1997, 40% of 
Indians lived in poverty and 30% were just above it.250 The condition suggests that the 
development and poverty alleviation policies did not work and economic growth did not 
strengthen democracy since most advantages were secured by the wealthy. 
Economic and social grievances of the Indians, specifically the Muslims, have 
received little attention from the Islamic world, except for Pakistan. The Kashmiri issue 
and the Muslim solidarity have influenced Pakistan’s strategic interest. The pan-Islamic 
organizations, like OIC, have made no concrete effort to expand their activities in 
Muslim minority areas, especially India. Issues such as the Kashmiri conflict, Pakistan’s 
exploitation of the maltreatment of Muslims in India and India’s effort to contain the 
issue by taking a pro-Arab stance in Palestinian do not receive attention by the OIC. 
Islamic solidarity is only seen in terms of charitable contributions to build madrasa and 
Indian Muslim minorities turn their attention toward self-help. 
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D. CONCLUSION 
Islam was first introduced in South and Southeast Asia as early as the 8th century 
and it has now undergone significant changes. The emergence of Islamic resurgence in 
the late 19th century and the post-colonial era and beyond, have changed the dynamics of 
Islam and Muslim identity in this part of Asia. Variants of Islamic ideologies have 
emerged in the form of organizational movements, political parties, and religious 
separatism. Generally, government’s response to these challenges also varies from one 
another. 
This comparative analysis argues that the ideological disposition of each state has 
had certain consequences on the course of development. The outcome depends upon the 
way each state leader adopts a particular ideology. The role of Islam in the state’s 
development programs, either being inclusive or exclusive, greatly impacts the 
development process. In Muslim or non-Muslim states, governments have not effectively 
addressed the political and economic grievances. Also, the self-determined aspirations of 
religious and ethnic minority groups contribute to the appeal for a political Islam and 
religious separatism.  
The most evident aspect of this comparative analysis is the effect of threat 
perceptions that the state leaders manipulated. In Malaysia, the idea of the clash of 
civilizations, which centered on the west’s opposition to Islam, has successfully 
mobilized the emerging Malaysian nationalism. After September 11, UMNO labeled its 
political rivalry PAS as a threat to national security and the domestic anti-terrorist 
campaign helped Malaysia discredit political Islam. In Indonesia, the perceived threat 
was within the national boundaries in which Islam was victimized, especially during the 
Suharto era. After that, Islam continued to be side-lined in the state’s development. 
Indonesia remains defensive by pressures from the Muslims parties that hamper its anti-
terrorist efforts. In India, religious separatism threatened the ideology of unity in 
diversity. Kashmir’s partition may affect the nation’s political resilience. To outweigh 
Pakistan over the Kashmir issue, India supported the Palestine cause. India’s anti-terrorist 
efforts were successful with the pacification of Sikh fundamentalism and Kashmir 
separatism. However, India has yet to make serious commitments against the growing 
threat of the Hindu nationalism. 
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In sum, the role of Islam differs fundamentally in countries with only a minority 
of Muslims in their populations from those with a Muslim majority. The problem the 
government faces it is that it must construct a lasting program that balances the needs of 
their Muslim constituencies without: (1) sacrificing the rights of ethnic minorities and 
political freedom such as in Malaysia or (2) excluding Islam in favor of a secular-
nationalistic ideology and favoring business partners and non-Muslims as in Indonesia, or 
(3) sacrificing the sovereign political administration of their territorial space and the 
wealthy exploiting resources, which India has experienced.  
To be successful, countries should include ethnics groups that are the major stake 
holders in nation-building. For ethnic the minority, they should share the ideological 
beliefs of the state. As the state seeks to establish a specific social agenda for 
development, any religious states may face challenges from a diversity of the population. 
The diversity makes it necessary for the state to favor a particular ethnic group over 
others, thus institutionalizing discrimination and intolerance. Therefore, in such an 
environment, ethnic minorities have to safeguard their interests within the nation-state 
itself, provided that the state does not discriminate on the basis of religion. The minorities 
should also be granted freedom in managing social and cultural institutions.  
Obviously, the public role of Islam in India, for example, is more restricted as 
compared to Malaysia and Indonesia. The secular government tried hard to include Islam 
as part of the nation building, but the political situation that is clouded by inter and intra-
religious, racial, and fundamentalist/extremist groups hindered such aspiration. Therefore 
the political goal of Muslim Indians is neither separatism nor dominance and neither have 
they hoped for outside support. They have wanted to maintain a religious identity and 
equality. Nevertheless, if the state does not meet their goals, there will be a perpetual 
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VI. SUMMARY, CONCLUSION, AND POLICY GUIDANCE 
A. INTRODUCTION 
This study was conducted to determine whether Islam has affected economic 
growth in Malaysia since its independence.  The descriptive method of research was used 
and the case study technique was used for gathering data. All the data collected came 
from primary, secondary and electronic resources.  Malaysia’s case is unique in the 
Muslim world and very rare in the Third World. Malaysia has achieved tremendous 
economic growth since independence and has successfully navigated the path through 
economic recessions in 1986 and 1997.  
B. SUMMARY OF FINDINGS 
1. Islam and the Malays 
Islam was introduced to the Malays through peaceful means by the Sufis and the 
Arab and Indian traders in the 14th century. Through the Malay sultanates, Islam was 
diffused to their subjects. The Malays are identified with Islam because almost all of 
them were Muslim. Malay Muslims are mostly Sunnis from the Shafi’i school with a 
strong influence by the Sufi, Hindu, and animistic sources. These influences declined in 
the process of education and modernization. 
There are four categories of Malay Muslim communities. The radicals advocate 
violent changes in the relationship between Islam and the Malaysian society. Other 
Muslim groups’ condemnation and the government’s stern actions made these radicals 
less credible. The traditionalists are the rural Malays who practice conservative and 
ritualistic Islamic beliefs. They are the bulk of the Malay-Islam, mostly peasants, and 
support a wider Islamic role in the government and society. The fundamentalists or the 
revivalists are the educated urban Malays that practice orthodox Islam. They seek to 
expand the role of Islam in economics, religion, and politics using education, forums, 
media and non-violent means. The accommodationists are the Malay politicians at the 
national level who emphasize ethnic unity in a pluralist society. The fundamentalist 
groups, the PAS and the UMNO, through government-sponsored agencies, have been the 
essential force in developing the Malaysian society. 
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Politically, the rural Malays contributed much of the support to the UMNO and 
the PAS. The UMNO leads the coalition government known as the National United Front 
while the latter is the leading opposition party. Followers of both parties adhere to the 
same religious beliefs and practices but differ in political ideology. The UMNO promotes 
Islamic universalism, multiculturalism, and Islamic modernism while the PAS promotes 
political Islam, which favors a religious state. While both envision a progressive 
Malaysia, the UMNO’s approach is more accommodative for a wider participation of all 
Malaysians and more active international participation. The PAS, on the other hand, is 
more conservative, using Islam as a modernizing force. 
Owing to intense political rivalries between both parties, each tried to “out-Islam” 
the other to gain political mileage. Apparently, the PAS political discourses were non-
violent except for one major racial riot in 1969. Parallel with the government’s effort 
against domestic terrorism, the PAS was connected to the Malay Muslim radicals. 
Malaysia has the internal security law (the ISA) to curb any religious radicals, militancy 
or instigators of sensitive issues that threaten national security. 
2. Islam and the State 
Malaysia is neither secular nor theocratic. Malaysia is perceived as a secular state, 
which practices a parliamentary democratic style of government. However, the 
government claims that Malaysia is an Islamic state based on Islam as the official 
religion, the head of state and the leaders are Muslims, and aspects of the Shari’a were 
implemented in the administration. 
Malaysia is ethnically heterogeneous. About 58% of the total population is 
bumiputera (indigenous locals, of whom the majority is Malay), 24% Chinese, 8% 
Indians, and 10% others. Ethnic pluralism emerged when the Chinese and the Indian 
workers immigrated to Malaysia during the British colonial rule. During the Japanese 
occupation, these ethnic groups, particularly the Malays and the Chinese, were the major 
opposition against the Japanese. 
The heterogeneous environment has led the Malaysian society to opt for some 
form of accommodation. In the bargain for independence in 1957, certain conditions in 
the form of social contracts were applied. The Malays retained political powers with their 
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special rights and privileges protected in the constitution:  Islam is the official religion; 
Malay is the national language; and the Malay sultans remain as the heads of state. The 
non-Malays [the Chinese and the Indian immigrants], on the other hand, were given 
citizenship. They had the right to participate in politics, to acknowledge the Malay’s 
special rights, and to continue leading in economics. They are also free to practice their 
own religion and culture. 
A multi-ethnic leadership was created in the form of a coalition government 
among the major ethnic groups led by the Malays.  The prime ministers and the deputy 
prime ministers were always Malay and the non-Malays were given ministerial positions. 
Independence gave Islam a constitution victory that allows Islam to play a major 
role in the state. The head of state and the prime ministers of Malaysia were elected 
following the caliphate tradition. Based on Muslim tradition, Malaysia is fit to be called 
Dar al-Islam, as Islam plays a dominant role. 
At the federal level, the role of Islam is advisory and ceremonial in nature. Some 
forms of Islamic values are inculcated in the administration and the government advises 
the Council of Rulers in matters pertaining to Islam. Islamic institutions and universities 
were established to further expose Malaysians and internationals on Islamic 
fundamentals. The federal government was also actively advancing Islamic ideals 
through international organizations and forums. At the state level, the Shari’a was 
implemented and administered by the state’s Religious Council. The Shari’a, however, 
does not apply to non-Muslims. 
Although the Muslims dominate, Malaysia stresses the concept of maslahah when 
managing communal issues. The Rukunegara, a national ideology, was implemented. 
This calls for unity, a democratic way of life, social justice, and an equal distribution of 
wealth. This strategy was successful in avoiding conflict and in promoting growth. 
3. Islam and Economics 
Some Muslims claim that Islam is compatible with material progress and 
modernity. The Malaysian government accepts this position. However, the claims were 
flawed by a shortage of empiric examples that transcend Islamic economic theory. 
Theories of an Islamic economy therefore remain debatable. 
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The real implementation of an Islamic economy follows the Shari’a. But it is only 
restricted to interest-free banking, market regulation by the government, management of 
the zakat, and regulating the family and social system such as inheritance, financial 
punishments, dowries, allowances, and the rulings with regard to widow and children. 
In Malaysia, the Islamic family and social systems are regulated through the state 
Religious Councils and the Shari’a courts, which were established during the British 
colonial rule. Additionally, Malaysia implemented significant Islamic banking systems 
by establishing the Pilgrims Savings Corporation, the Islamic Bank, the Takaful 
Malaysia, and the Zakat collection centers. 
Malaysia has encouraged the empowerment of women and believes that “an 
increase in the supply of labor can increase economic growth.”251 Female workers were 
important contributors to the country’s economic growth. In the mid-1990s, for example, 
the female labor force was between 44 and 46%. 
Malaysia believes that “invention and motivation must be encouraged and the role 
of education is essential.”252 Education was made a priority to develop the social capital, 
a prerequisite for growth. State-sponsored and private institutions, which teach a secular 
and Islamic curriculum, were established to give all Malaysians, including women, a 
better education. Children at the age of six began pre-school. At seven, they continued 
their education until the tertiary levels.  Although Malay is the national language, mass 
literacy in other languages, particularly English, was encouraged. 
4. Islam and Growth 
Critics of Islamic economics were skeptical that an economy based on Islamic 
principles could promote growth. However, analyzing Islam as one of the variables for 
growth, much research suggests that Islam promotes growth.253 There is no conflict 
between the values of Islam and the values required for economic growth. Religious ideas 
can positively impact economic growth. 
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In Malaysia, it was evidenced that Islam promotes growth. However, there is no 
robust relationship between Islam and economic growth at the sub-national level. The 
Malay-Muslim fundamentalist groups, which were built upon revivalist Islamic principles 
and a thriving economic enterprise, may have positively contributed to this growth. The 
government, on the other hand, had significantly played an interventionist role in 
economic governance. To regulate the economy, development-oriented institutions and 
policies, and a necessary framework to enact, to finance and to construct socio-economic 
infrastructures were created. Broad participation, inclusiveness of Islam in development, 
and the pursuit of public interests were assured. 
Economic growth typically refers to an increase in a country's output of goods and 
services, and is usually measured by changes in real GDP.254 Since its independence, 
Malaysia has enjoyed a relatively high growth rate. Its GDP had increased from an 
average of 6% to 10%, except during crises periods such as in 1986 and 1997. 
Due to scarce economic resources, increasing the quality of farmland will increase 
economic growth.255 To eradicate poverty among the rural Malays who practiced an 
agriculture-based economy, Malaysia adopted a rural development policy through 
agrarian reforms. This policy transformed the poor Malay community to a commercial-
oriented sector. The rural sector is vital to the country’s economic growth, and its social 
and political development. 
A lack of entrepreneurial and risk-taking managers will hamper levels of 
growth.256 To avert crises, the government responded with development policies that are 
peculiar to the situation. These included economic diversification, the NEP, the 
Malaysian incorporated, and the currency control, which were considered risk-taking, as 
evidenced in the 1960s, 1980s, and 1990s. 
 
 
                                                 




The government succeeded in building self-confidence and a “can do” attitude 
among the people, particularly the Malays, who were once labeled as lazy. However, to 
instill such self-discipline and to accelerate progress, the government resorts to 
questionable means such as eradicating its political rivalries and creating cronies. 
5. Malaysia’s Development Model 
In any community development, nation-building or post-conflict reconstruction 
efforts, there are certain model that a specific country, agency, or community has 
adopted. There are various private-sector development models available, for example the 
World Bank and the IMF, the community-based model, the “Marshall Plan” for 
reconstruction of post-war Europe, or the post-conflict reconstruction pillars.257 Some of 
the basic characteristics of these models can be adopted, employing the assumptions, 
principles, elements, and process. However, a model of a particular country may not be 
compatible with others due to different variables such as security, scarcity of resources, 
ethnicity, and financing. Any ready-made model that one tries to introduce for a 
particular situation may end in failure. On the other hand, the Malaysian experience has 
shown that variants or combination of models can be successful. 
Malaysia’s development model is peculiar to its security, natural resources, 
politico-religious, socio-economic, and pluralistic environment.  Malaysia has chosen a 
combination of secular and Islamic development models. Malaysia adopts the western as 
well as the Japanese/Korean model such as laissez-faire, late industrialization, affirmative 
action, privatization, and economic liberalization. At the same time, Malaysia promotes 
an Islamic economic system as part of the Shari’a implementation, which covers interest-
free banking, zakat, and the Islamic family and social system.  The top-down approach 
was applied as evidenced by active government participation in all sectors. 
 
 
                                                 
257 See for example “The Marshall Plan.” Database on-line. Available from George C. Marshall Foundation. 
http://www.marshallfoundation.org/about_gcm/marshall_plan.htm#truman_doctrine. Accessed 6 November 2003; Ross 
Gittell and Avis Dival, Community Organizing: Building Social Capital as a Development Strategy (Thousand Oaks: 
SAGE Publications, 1998); “The Post-Conflict Security Building and Reconstruction Pillars,” Center for the Strategic 
and International Studies, 2001. 
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There are certain processes that Malaysia’s development model has implemented. 
Since the pre-independence period, Malaysia has formulated a “Five-Year Development 
Plan.” The first development plan was introduced in 1956 and until now, Malaysia has 
successfully implemented ten such plans. 
From 1957 to 1970, a market-led economy through laissez-faire policies was 
implemented concurrent with the five-year plans. Malaysian economy during this period 
depended heavily on producing and exporting tin and rubber. The government actively 
intervened to develop the agricultural and rural sectors concerning the traditional Malay 
subsistence regions that were neglected during the British colonial rule. Agriculture 
contributes much more of the GDP than manufacturing. Thus, the government promoted 
an import-substituting industrialization. 
From 1970 to 1990, a state-led development strategy was initiated. The NEP was 
introduced, which legitimized the increase in the state and public sector intervention for 
inter-ethnic redistribution. The aim was to eradicate poverty and to eliminate the 
identification of race and ethnicity in economic matters. The NEP consolidated the 
development strategy of export-oriented industrialization and directly redressed the 
ethnic imbalances in economy. 
From 1981 until 1985, a heavy industrializations period, the Japanese/Korean 
models were emulated as examples. The government subsidized heavy industries, such as 
steel and auto manufacturing. The mid-1980s was also a countercyclical period, due to 
the global crisis that severely struck the Malaysia’s economy. 
From 1986 to the present, Malaysia initiated a more pragmatic policy of 
administrative reform, known as the Malaysian Incorporation. It was the economic 
liberalization period and privatization was encouraged. This policy uses consultative 
mechanism and public-private collaboration with the government influencing the 
direction of development. The manufacturing sector grew, characterized by domestic 
market and export-orientated structures. In 1991, this policy was formalized as the NDP. 
In 1997, Malaysia implemented a drastic currency control in response to the Asian 
financial crisis. 
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For the 21st century, Malaysia initiated “Vision 2020,” a plan that envisioned the 
country to be fully developed by the year 2020. Currently, this vision was reflected in the 
efforts to make Malaysia a center for tourism, education, IT, and knowledge-based 
industries. 
Despite adopting secular development models, Malaysia established a moral order 
motivated by Islamic principles in its nation building. In 1984, Malaysia took the 
Islamization process seriously by inculcating Islamic values in the administration. Key 
Islamic institutions were restructured. An Islamic banking system was introduced. To 
further educate Malaysian on modern and progressive Islam, IKIM and the International 
Islamic University were established to expand the Islamic curriculum taught in the local 
training institutions. 
C. CONCLUSION 
What we have factually learned about Malay Islam is that they were conservative 
Sunni who followed the fundamentals of Islam’s rejection of violence. Those Malays 
who pursued political Islam have learned from the bitter experience of 1969 that 
promotion of such an ideology must be through peaceful means. Additionally, party 
leaders must demonstrate tangible outcomes in terms of material benefit for the society to 
gain support among Muslims. In Malaysia, pursuing Muslims’ aspiration through radical 
means could not receive popular support and would face sanctions by the ISA. This law 
imposes harsh restrictions of political and civil rights, but it is meant to curb violence that 
can deter growth and make a functioning democracy impossible. 
We have also learned that Islam can coexist with other religions. The government 
has called for a system of accommodation and broad participation. Any differences were 
clearly laid down under the social contract. In the long run, the pro-Muslims policy 
effectively addressed the political and economic grievances that benefited the whole 
society in the form of economic growth. With the political and socio-economic successes, 
Islam was widely received by the non-Muslims. Furthermore, through public education, 
the ideological foundations of Islamic universalism, multiculturalism, and Islamic 
modernism were strengthened. Malaysia demonstrates that Islam can be compatible with 
modernization. As Islam was included in nation-building, Malaysia’s tremendous 
achievements were considered a success for Islam. 
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However, we have learned that Malaysia’s success does not solely rely on Islam. 
In fact, implementing an Islamic economic system in Malaysia does not go beyond 
interest-free banking, administering Islamic family and social system, and inculcating 
Islamic values in the administration. The principles of secular development models such 
as security, good planning and management, flexibility, pragmatism, and learning from 
others were strictly adhered to. Certain Islamic principles such as maslahah, social 
justice, consensus, conserving public resources, and universalism have boosted 
Malaysia’s continued growth. Malaysia demonstrated that the combination of secular and 
Islamic models of development was the best solution in the long run, especially for a 
pluralistic society. 
Malaysia was idolized by many Muslim and non-Muslim governments because it 
exemplified a rare and unique experience among the Third-World countries. Malaysia’s 
recipe for success was based on these major assumptions: (1) Malaysia planned its 
economic programs. (2) Malaysia had leaders with a vision to articulate and implement 
policies. (3) Malaysia had adequate natural resources to be tapped and exported. (4) 
Malaysia diversified its economy from agriculture-based to manufacturing and heavy 
industries. (5) Malaysia had learned a continuous stability from its past experiences, 
whether from the communist insurgency or the racial riots, or from the threat posed by 
religious radicals. (6) Internal security law was used to protect the maslahah of the 
society rather than individual rights. (7) Citizens broadly participated in different 
segments of society, removing discrimination and reducing alienation. (8) Affirmative 
action was implemented to reduce separations and divisions in the society due to race, 
ethnicity, and religion. (9) The Malaysian economic governance was improved with the 
institutionalization of the public-private sector collaboration in economics. (10) Islam’s 
role in the society was broadened in the pluralist society and became inclusive in the 
nation-building. (11) Differences in religious-politico ideologies among the Muslim sects 
were reconciled through democratic processes, not through violence. (12) Education was 
given priority to develop human capital, which promotes innovation and initiative. (13) 
Women, apart from being an integral and important element of the educated workforce, 
play an active role in the society.  
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Key actors or elements can ensure that this model will work: A responsible 
leader; a strong government; a professional government bureaucracy; a sound and ethical 
business community; a social contract; the ISA; development plans, such as the Five-
Year plans, the NEP, the NDP, and the Malaysia Incorporation; coalition political 
parties—the National United Front; IKIM; religious councils; Islamic banking; and 
Muslim fundamentalists or revivalists. 
Despite many successes, Malaysia’s model had some weaknesses. Over-
dependence on the ISA in the pretext of national security has caused great dissatisfaction 
pertaining to people’s individual rights and the rule of law. While Malaysia’s material 
successes should strengthen democracy, the authoritarian style of leadership will 
perpetuate Malaysia’s label of “a pseudo-democracy” to continue. The pro-Malay 
affirmative action has not reached its targeted goals, and it was said to have benefited few 
Malays and government cronies. 
Islam has positively affected Malaysia’s economic growth in many ways. The 
most significant is that the Muslim Malays correctly interpreted Islam.  Malaysia has 
good and responsible Malay-Muslim leaders, yet the Muslims poverty levels were 
elevated and many have turned to the business sectors. The Islamic and secular education 
systems were improved, including the learning of English. Muslim women were free to 
engage in socio-economic and political activities. The Islamic banking system was 
institutionalized and the religious institutions were restructured. Islamic values were 
inculcated in the government administration. The Muslim fundamentalists with 
revivalists’ principles and business-mindedness supported modernization. 
D. POLICY GUIDANCE 
An answer to whether Islam promotes economic growth is clearly evidenced.  We 
believe that by learning from others, Muslims can improve their economic position. Some 
government programs such as poverty eradication through affirmative action, outward 
development models, and correct policy prescription can elevate Muslims to the 
limelight. In situations in which ethnic pluralism exists, rifts across racial and religious 
lines should be managed involving a wide spectrum of political initiatives and tolerance 
so that equality and stability can be achieved to further growth. In these situations, 
balanced growth is the viable solution to progress. 
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Malaysia offers much experience in economic success. Malaysia has a stable 
political system. With planned programs, Malaysia abstained from major policy changes 
upon reaching independence, except for certain pragmatic policies in response to crises. 
Malaysia has no experience in socialist economics or inward-looking economic policies. 
Ethnicity plays a major role in the distribution of wealth and income. The government 
took an interventionist role in the economy and was quite consistent. Malaysian Islam is 
seen as an important variable for growth because it follows the fundamentals of Islam and 
is willing to modernize. 
An effective strategy to eradicate poverty requires broad-based political 
participation and planned programs that can be achieved. The poor tend to benefit from a 
sustained and high rate of growth only if they are given the opportunities to improve their 
assets, for example, through public investment in education, health, and infrastructure. 
Capturing human development in the fullest sense is of great importance to 
Muslim nations. Education challenges exist since literacy gaps are prominent in Muslim 
countries. Muslims need to consider subscribing to the call for Islamic universalism to 
make them more rational in their actions.  
The reasons for the poor economic performance of Muslim countries must be 
determined particularly in their poorly managed development activity. Establishing 
relevant institutions and adopting appropriate policies constitute the foundation for 
successful economic governance. Instead of advocating an Islamic strategy of 
development, the integration of Islamic institutions into a development strategy will 
prove more beneficial. 
The Islamic revival in almost all Muslim countries has now created the need for a 
clear integrated picture of the program that Islam has to offer. Government policies 
should focus on countering the differences facing Muslims particularly in the Islamic 
economic system and political ideology. We hope this research can give some insight to 
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